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Introduction 
On 8 February 1912 a telegram was sent. Its consigner was the Viceroy of India: 
Charles Hardinge, 1st Baron Hardinge of Penshurst. A handwritten note on top of the 
document stated that ‘a copy was left at the F.O. [Foreign Office].1 Given its first 
sentence, it may very well have been intended for someone with whom he was well 
acquainted, as well as a person familiar with the Aga Khan and his status: 
‘Private. I think you realise what an immense amount of assistance 
Government of India receives from the Aga Khan, so I make no 
apology in asking your good offices in a matter which very closely 
concerns him in East Africa.' 2 
The subject discussed in the telegram was the Mnazi Moja burial ground on the island 
of Zanzibar. Penhurst expounds, quite plainly, the nature of his request on behalf of 
the Aga Khan: 
‘It appears that an agreement was come to between the Zanzibar 
Government and himself [the Aga Khan] in 1899 in regard to a burial 
ground and the lands lying around it called Nazi Moja. Since 1910 the 
Zanzibar Government has disturbed the status quo by letting out the 
lands for stalls and cinematographs, and actually receive payment for 
them. All that he asks is that the status quo of 1899-1909 may be 
maintained, and if it is really necessary in the interests of Zanzibar to 
make changes in it that they may be deferred until His Highness visits 
East Africa, which he is likely to do within the next year or two, when 
they can be the subject of negotiation.'3 
For reasons not mentioned in the telegram, Hardinge had found it necessary to 
intervene in a local, East African affair, outside the boundaries of his direct 
jurisdiction. The telegram itself does not elaborate on the ‘immense amount of 
assistance' the Aga Khan purportedly gave to the Indian government. Among like-
minded agents of the empire, some things were obvious; they needed no explanation. 
The Aga Khan's status - at least in the mind of the Viceroy - apparently was one of 
those things. 
What had spurred the Viceroy, one of the highest colonial officers in the Empire, 
into action? Although there is no direct reference to it in the telegram, a closer 
examination of the exact formulation may indicate the source. The telegram speaks of 
                                                 
1 IOR/L/PS/10/588/2, Viceroy to Foreign Office, 08-02-1912. IOR indicates these are 
documents from the India Office Records. L/PS indicates that it originates from the 
Political and Secret Department of the India Office and is the attribute for records 
related to Zanzibar. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Ibidem. 
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two parties: the Zanzibar Government and the Aga Khan. Given the fact that the 
Viceroy had little knowledge, if any, about the dealings of the local communities of 
Zanzibar and that it spoke of the Government breaking the status quo it is very 
unlikely that he had received this information from within the official colonial 
channels. Therefore, the most probable candidate for giving the Viceroy the 
information he needed to send the telegram is the Aga Khan himself. Hardinge, it 
seems, took over the information given to him by the Aga Khan, and asked for the 
assistance of his Imperial colleagues. The Aga Khan, in other words, was a reliable 
source of information. And to the Aga Khan, the issue at hand mattered a great deal. 
As stated in the telegram, in 1899, an agreement was made between the religious 
leader of the Shiïte Ismaili sect and the British colonial government concerning a 
burial ground on Zanzibar. The Aga Khan was born in 1877 in the city of Karachi, and 
living in the city of Bombay. Since the death of his father in 1885, he had been the 
spiritual head of the Isma'ilis. In 1899, he was 22 years of age. It was not his cemetery 
that needed safekeeping. Nor was it the final resting place of any of his relatives. In 
fact, Sultan Muhammad Shah had never set foot on the island of Zanzibar before the 
year 1899.4 
The cemetery located at the grounds of Mnazi Moja, instead, belonged to a 
specific Indian community: the Khojas, many of whom were regarded as the followers 
of the Aga Khan. And indeed, there had been such an agreement. It was drafted on 15 
September 1899 and had been the result of negotiations that had lasted for more than 
two months. At best, it could be described as a compromise which was meant to bring 
an end to a long lasting conflict about the burial ground, not only within the greater 
Khoja community of Zanzibar, but also between the Khojas and the Zanzibar 
authorities.5 In the Viceroy's message, the Khojas play no role of significance in the 
Mnazi Moja agreement. Yet he is familiar with them as followers of the Aga Khan: 
‘I would urge that the Aga Khan and his followers are a useful asset 
from an Imperial point of view, and it would help us here if we could 
show to him that his support is appreciated not only in India but 
throughout the Empire.‘ 6 
A useful asset. An immense amount of assistance. Although the Aga Khan's status and 
that of his followers was no doubt higher than that of the average colonial servant; 
they may seem to have been, when carefully weighing the words of the Viceroy, also 
exactly that: colonial servants, or in the case of the Aga Khan, maybe even a reliable 
source of information. They were needed for the integrity and unity of the British 
colonial Empire. They could be utilized in an instrumental, rational and calculated 
                                                 
4  Sultan Muhammad Shah, Memoirs: World Enough and Time (London 1954) 60. 
5  IOR/L/PJ/6/525/File 2280, Mnazi Moja Agreement, 15-09-1899. The earmark L/PJ 
indicates that this file originates from the Public and Judicial Department of the 
India Office. 
6  IOR/L/PS/10/588/2, Viceroy to Foreign Office, 08-02-1912. 
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manner, but always be the subaltern. Judging by these words coming from the 
Viceroy, the relationship between Aga Khan, the Khojas and the British empire was, 
from the point of view of the latter, a marriage of convenience. 
The outline of this historical event as sketched above is the main concern of this 
thesis. Why was a local dispute about a burial ground important to the British, while 
most affairs of such institutions as the India Office were of a political or 
(inter)national character? By studying this micro-history on the Island of Zanzibar in 
the period 1899-1912, this thesis contributes to our understanding of the relationship 
between the Khojas, the Aga Khan and the British. It does so by picking up the trail 
left by recent insights with regard to the history and interconnectedness of the Khoja 
community and the Aga Khan. 
From a colonial perspective it may very well be possible to pinpoint the creation 
of the modern Khoja community: the ruling of Justice Arnould of the Bombay High 
court on 12 November 1866, of which the Khoja's were the main subject. From that 
day on, they would be viewed as Isma'ili Muslims by the colonial system. The leader 
of all Khoja's would therefore be the Aga Khan; the spiritual head of the Nizari 
Isma'ili sect, who claimed to be the direct descendant and successor of the Prophet 
Mohamed, founder of Islam.7 The Isma'ili branch of Islam, like other Shi'ite branches, 
has its origins in Persia. It emerged in the late 8th century and experienced a golden 
age in the century that followed, after which a gradual decline set in. A considerable 
gap in time exists - roughly between 1200 and 1750 - about which not much is known 
with regard to the fate of the Isma'ilis. One crucial historical aspect, several journeys 
to South Asia made by Isma'ili missionaries, did take place after which part of a low-
caste community, the Khojas, was converted. 
The first Aga Khan, who claimed direct descendancy of the prophet Islam 
Mohamed, left Persia in the early 1840s. He sought refuge after a dispute with several 
Persian notables, and found this in the British. He would never return to Persia.8 After 
having arrived in Bombay, the Aga Khan started making plans for creating a loyal 
base of followers. His main focus was the Khoja community. Khoja's had migrated to 
the city of Bombay at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Since then, their 
community had grown rapidly. They were mostly active in trade.9 By running an 
active campaign, the Aga Khan gradually gained more influence. This caused part of 
the community to resist. Several lawsuits followed regarding the customs of the 
community, all which were lost by the imam.10 This changed in 1866. Some twenty 
years after his arrival in India, the Aga Khan succeeded in gaining sufficient control 
over the Khoja's. He asked all members of the Bombay Khoja community to pledge 
                                                 
7 Justice Amould, 12 Nov. 1866, in the judgement of, The Advocate General vs. 
Muhammad Husen Huseni - "The Aga Khan Case". 
8 Farhad Daftary, A short history of the Ismailis: traditions of a Muslim community 
(London 1998) 21-24, 196. 
9 Teena Purohit, The Aga Khan Case: Religion and Identity in Colonial India 
(London 2012) 23, 36. 
10 Purohit, The Aga Khan Case, 18, 22-28; Daftary, A short history, 198. 
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him loyalty. The majority agreed.11 For those resisting the Aga Khan, this was 
unacceptable and eventually, in 1866, a lawsuit followed. They charged the imam 
with the argument that he was not a Khoja, and could therefore make no claim on any 
aspect of the community. Their evidence for this was that the Khojas were Sunni's. 
Since the Aga Khan was a Shi'i, he could never be a Khoja.12 
The Aga Khan won. As prime evidence, the court had used the main religious text 
of the Khoja's, the Ginans, and labelled this to be a Shi'ite book of conversion. The 
difference between Sunni's and Shi'is was further explained as being similar to the 
difference between catholics and protestants. Even the fact that some 400 year earlier, 
several Isma'ili missionaries had succeeded in converting Khoja's to Nizari 
Isma'ilism, to the court, attested to its conviction that the Khojas were indeed Shi'i 
Nizari Isma'ilis.13 What were the consequences of the ruling? From this point on there 
existed a legal definition of what it meant to be a Khoja. One, perhaps the most 
important aspect of the ruling that should immediately be expressed here is that the 
Khojas were by no means now "imprisoned" from a religious point of view. In 
practice, however, it would be very difficult to secede from the majority of the 
community, since there existed a mutual dependence between its members. Choosing 
another faith also meant leaving the community. But the outcome affected more than 
just the daily lives of the members of the Khoja community. The consequences would 
also be far reaching for the way in which its history would be recorded. Many of the 
modern chapters of Isma'ili and Khoja history have, over the course of some 150 
years, become entangled with one another. 
The main reason for their equalization is to be found in the involvement of the Aga 
Khan in writing the history of both. Most modern historical works on the history of 
Nizari Isma'ilism have been published by the Institute of Isma'ili studies, which was 
founded by the current and 49th Isma'ili Imam, Aga Khan IV in 1977.14 Characteristic 
for the institute is its approach to research: it takes the leadership of the Aga Khan as 
the starting point for writing Isma'ili history and then conducts research that fits 
within that frame. To the institute, therefore, the intertwinement between Khoja and 
Isma'ili history is in no way problematic, the ruling of 1866 no more than the 
confirmation of this view. This, in recent times, has caught the attention of several 
researchers of colonialism. 
One of those researchers is Teena Purohit. She contends that the ruling in the Aga 
Khan case is the result of a faulty and orientalist interpretation of the Ginans. 
According to the court, the tenth chapter, titled Dasavatār, was of Isma'ili origin. 
Through an analysis of Dasavatār, Purohit convincingly demonstrates that this 
conclusion is wrong.15 The faulty logic of the colonial court has thus affected modern 
historical research on the (formation of) the Nizari Ismaili community. Purohit 
                                                 
11 Farhad Daftary, The Ismailis: their History and Doctrines (London 2007) 475. 
12 Purohit, The Aga Khan Case, 36. 
13 Ibidem, 53. 
14 Daftary, A short history, 18. 
15 Purohit, The Aga Khan Case, 6. 
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criticizes the institute of Isma'ili studies for using the Aga Khan case as a valid 
argument to defend the leadership of the Aga Khan over the Khoja community and for 
writing them into Isma'ili history. Her work shows that, although they are mixed in 
contemporary history, their origins are not the same. 
Purohit largely treats the Aga Khan Case as a an event that had only taken place 
within a South Asian context. Others have studied the take-over of the Khoja 
community by the Aga Khan in a somewhat different context. Nile Green, for 
example, takes a step back, and places the Khoja's within a larger, more urban setting. 
Through the creation of his own interpretative model, that of religious economy, he is 
able to analyse them as part of the dynamic between "consumers and "producers" of 
the various forms of Islam that could be found in Bombay during the period 1840-
1915. Bombay, according to Green, was ideally suited for people with religious 
ambitions, such as the Aga Khan. Its modern infrastructure - telegraph, steam trains 
and boats, printing press - made exchange possible on a much larger scale than ever 
before in history. It facilitated the import of many religious currents, while at same 
time tailoring them to fit any audience. Some of these would evidently be suitable for 
exploitation in other areas.16 The Aga Khan, Green contends, was part of the religious 
economy of Bombay. He used these modern tools, backed through the ruling of the 
Aga Khan case, to create and maintain a following not just in India, but also on the 
shores of the Indian ocean. Although he has an eye for the possibilities of exporting 
religion to other regions of the Indian Ocean, Green pays no attention to those Khojas 
residing abroad. 
These and other studies into the interrelationship between the Khojas and the Aga 
Khan have in recent years created a small new research field titled Khoja Studies. Its 
main goal is to retrace the modern history of the Khojas that, as a result of the Aga 
Khan case, have been assimilated into the collective of the Nizari Isma'ilis. The fate 
of the Khojas in India has by and large been investigated, amongst others by Teena 
Purohit. A subject that has been studied much less is the fate of the Khojas outside of 
India, but within the context of the quickly modernising early twentieth century. From 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, many Khojas migrated along the shores of the 
Indian ocean. Zanzibar was one of the oldest Khoja communities outside India.17 
It is this context of time, place and subject in which the source material used for 
thesis can be placed. These building blocks will be used to analyse the relationships 
between the Khojas, the Aga Khan and the British involved in the Mnazi Moja dispute 
in order to place these in the larger frame of the recent insights obtained in the field of 
Khoja studies. Zanzibar was the first expatriate Isma’ili community the young Aga 
Khan III would visit in 1899.18 He would go there as a young man, inexperienced in 
the international world of colonial administration. The agreement would serve as a 
precursor for the events of 1912. 
                                                 
16 Nile Green, Bombay Islam: The Religious Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 
1840-1915 (Cambridge 2011) 2, 3. 
17 Hatim Amiji, ‘Some Notes on Religious Dissent in Nineteenth-Century East 
Africa’, African Historical Studies 4:3 (1971) 605, 606. 
18 Shah, Memoirs, 59. 
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The sources used for this thesis are mainly from the India Office Records. In the past 
three decades there has been much debate about the question how the contents of 
colonial archives should be valued and studied. Two important voices in this debate 
belong to Ranajit Guha and Ann Laura Stoler. The primary sources will be analysed 
on the basis of their insights. They represent, in many ways, the way in which the 
debate has evolved. The first chapter will therefore be used to elaborate on their 
contributions. The outcome of this will be the instrument used to analytically describe 
the content of these sources. The description has two parts. Chapter two will be used 
to sketch the circumstances on the island of Zanzibar in the year 1899, leading up to 
the original Mnazi Moja agreement. Chapter three deals with the Mnazi Moja Dispute 
as it unfolded in 1912. 
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1. Reflection on the sources 
As stated in the introduction, this thesis aims to contribute to a greater understanding 
of the relationship between the Khojas, the Aga Khan and the British on the island of 
Zanzibar for the period 1899-1912. It does so by re-evaluating the Mnazi Moja 
dispute in which all three players have an active role. The actual events will be 
discussed in chapters two and three. This first chapter will be used to reflect upon the 
source material so that it may be used as the basis of this micro-history. 
The source material used for this thesis mainly consists of records from British 
colonial archives. The fragments of text used above are taken from one document in 
one file that is part of the vast archives of the India Office Records: File 748/1916 Pt 
2 The Aga Khan; the Khoja community. Its main contents are copies of 
correspondence between several colonial British officers, dated between 7 February 
1912 and 27 June 1912, the subject of which is the burial ground on Zanzibar. On first 
sight it is possible to make a simple distinction between the types of content found. 
The officers present in the archive are either from the Foreign Office or India Office. 
They differ in rank and status, and much of what they exchange and how they do this 
can be explained on the basis of this. A basic rule of thumb is that the higher ranking 
officers, such as for example the Viceroy, are not the "creators" of information. There 
are, of course exceptions to this rule, and these will be discussed if necessary in this 
thesis. The main role these higher officers had was circulation of the content. Others, 
more on the edge of this chain of communication, were the producers of content. An 
example of this in File 748 is the Aga Khan. This meant the imam had access to the 
archive, albeit indirect, via Hardinge. The Khojas on the other hand, had no such 
access, and could therefore not control whatsoever it was that ended up in the 
archives. Being in control of the flow of information had the advantage of deciding 
what others did or did not know, while providing information had the advantage of 
setting the agenda. As shall be demonstrated in this thesis, this role distribution was of 
influence on the course of this micro-history. 
Although other files exist on the subject of the burial ground, the fragment taken 
from file 748/1916, in the eyes of the author, is representative of the source material 
that will be used for this thesis. Most of it was not produced “on site”. Neither were 
most correspondents directly involved in the matter. Non-European subjects of the 
British empire, regardless of their background, are - at a first glance - portrayed as 
assets. 
Taking this first exploration of the source material into consideration, a discipline 
that soon springs into mind when researching an Indian community such as the 
Khoja's based on source material originating from British colonial records, is that of 
writing history from the perspective of the colonial subject, otherwise known as 
Subaltern Studies. Take for example Guha's famous essay The Prose of Counter-
Insurgency. Published in 1983, his main contention here is that the tightness of British 
colonial rule had severe consequences for both the people at subaltern levels as well 
as those in power. 
The colonial world was made up out of social “codes” that determined position, 
status and purpose. For historians of colonialism it is possible to compose a 
“codebook” that could be utilized to read the social structure of British colonialism. 
The ultimate goal of this system was control. 
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If a subaltern would protest or otherwise revolt or take action against any aspect of 
colonial rule, he would be sure to find himself labelled as subversive, insurgent, an 
unwanted element. Therefore, if such “subversive” actions could be traced back in the 
archives, they would be marked as such. Consequently, an angry farmer would be 
traceable in the archives as ‘insurgent', and ‘resistance to oppression' would be found 
as ‘daring and wanton atrocities on the inhabitants'. The codebook was so strict that 
the ‘antagonism between the two is irreducible and there is nothing to leave room for 
neutrality'. In practice, this means an attempt at surpassing the intentions of the 
knowledge produced by the colonial system. It is thus necessary to find a method of 
translation in order to retrace the intentions and actions of the subaltern back from the 
archives. The method used by Guha is called “reading against the grain”, or “turning 
things upside down”. Examples of this are given in his Prose: those who were 
labelled as ‘fanatics' in the colonial archives, were in fact ‘Islamic puritans'; those 
who were ‘disturbing the public tranquil(l)ity' were actually involved in a ‘struggle 
for a better order'.19 
This, in its core, is what an archive is to Guha: colonial subjects who revolted 
against their rulers were not only physically locked away or hurt otherwise. They 
were also rendered to a state of subservience on another level. An archive offered the 
possibility of "image building"; a much stronger, more durable, more potent manner 
of control. Only colonial officers had access to the archive, and thus they were the 
sole masters of its content. But it not only controlled the way in which subalterns 
were seen by colonial officers on the spot; also, civil servants elsewhere, in space and 
time, would be likely to take over the images sketched by their original maker. Guha 
then firmly concludes that, given the nature and content of the archive, it is rendered 
unusable. It is, in his mind, not possible to "neutralize" the effects of an archive's 
content so that they can be given a proper historical analysis. No historian should use 
them as a reliable source. 
Although the author of this thesis agrees with Guha that colonial archives are 
unlikely to contain much in terms of neutral information, understanding the archive 
solely as a place of captivity must seem, to most historians, an uneasy proposition. 
Using the method of reading against the grain alone to "salvage what is left" from 
these sources becomes problematic when applied to the Viceroy's telegram. A 
reassessment of the first section of his telegram, shows that Harding leaves quite a bit 
of room for interpretation for his recipient: 
‘I think you realise what an immense amount of assistance Government 
of India receives from the Aga Khan, so I make no apology in asking 
your good offices in a matter which very closely concerns him in East 
Africa. It appears that an agreement was come to between the Zanzibar 
                                                 
19 Ranajit Guha, ‘The Prose of Counter-Insurgency' in Ranajit Guha ed., Selected 
Subaltern Studies II (Oxford 1983) 15. 
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Government and himself in 1899 in regard to a burial ground and the 
lands lying around it called Nazi Moja.'20 
Hardinge being the Viceroy, he did ask the "good offices" of his colleagues, albeit in a 
manner that very firmly made clear the urgency of his request. Yet, with regard to the 
contents of the message, he left quite some room for interpretation. To the Viceroy, 
the Aga Khan's status was very clear, but he was not so sure if all of his colleagues 
had made the same estimation. Were he and his colleagues on the same footing? Do 
they value the Aga Khan in "the right" way? Did they "realize" the value of the Aga 
Khan, whatever it was? Was he even sure of himself? The fact that he had come to the 
point of actually writing and sending a telegram perhaps shows that the Viceroy -at 
the least- perceived the Aga Khan's grief as real enough. But whether the complete 
story of the Aga Khan should be treated as such - reality, also in the administrative, 
colonial sense of the word - Hardinge could not tell. And thus he contacted his 
colleagues - the Aga Khan was important enough for that -, but instead of orders or 
demands, he asked them (which was intimidating enough for some), and told them 
that there "appeared to be" an agreement. Other parts of the Viceroy's telegram, too, 
are a mismatch with the Subaltern Studies' perspective on the information present in 
the archive, namely the idea that these archives purposely created singular images of 
subalterns, to be turned upside down: 
'All that he asks is that the status quo of 1899-1909 may be maintained, 
and if it is really necessary in the interests of Zanzibar to make changes 
in it that they may be deferred until His Highness visits East Africa 
which he is likely to do within the next year or two, when they can be 
the subject of negotiation.'21 
‘I would urge that the Aga Khan and his followers are a useful asset'.22 
In the first quote, the Aga Khan is represented by Hardinge, and treated with all 
respect. The spiritual head of the Isma'ili's is even called "His Highness"; a title that 
would most likely not be used to address the everyday colonial servant, or indeed, it is 
only used by those who wish to denote a character of higher esteem. By any means 
the use of "His Highness" is also not meant in a cynical way. The spiritual head was 
to be assisted in all reasonable terms. Zanzibar's interests did not outrank those of the 
Aga Khan. The matter, so it seems, should even be laid to rest for another two years if 
necessary. 
On the other hand, there is the second quote, in which the Aga Khan and his 
followers are labelled as "a useful asset". This would indeed be the sort of term one 
would expect to find using the Subalterns Studies' lens. Used to assert control over 
                                                 
20 IOR/L/PS/10/588/2, Viceroy to Foreign Office, 08-02-1912. 
21 Ibidem. 
22 Ibidem. 
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the resources of the colonial empire, these people and their religious leader should be 
managed, so that they may continue to be of added value. 
Having arrived at this point - multiple perspectives on one subaltern, several 
possibilities with regard to the interpretation of the intentions of one colonial officer, 
uncertainty on the view of his colleagues - the subaltern studies' perspective becomes 
more and more obscure. Having only read one section from the first file in dossier 
748/1916 Pt2, quite soon, there is "room" for error, interpretation, doubt, for other 
truths. Surely the actions and intentions of colonial subjects in the archives need - if 
anything - translation. This is still a valid point for students and researchers of 
colonialism alike. They should be treated with care, suspicion even. But rendering 
them useless because of this fails to acknowledge that there are more perspectives, 
questions, insights and images to be retrieved from these archives. 
The insights delivered by Guha and other researchers of subaltern studies have 
been an important step in our thinking about the use of archives in colonial studies. 
By challenging the assertion that, as sources, archives contained neutral information 
that could be reproduced directly as historical knowledge, they have set an important 
part of the agenda for colonial studies and their respective archives. The debates that 
followed have explored the possibilities and impossibilities of colonial archives. In 
the current state of affairs not many - Guha included - would follow the theoretical 
take on colonial archives as posited in The Prose of Counter-Insurgency. It is now 
generally assumed that archives as a whole do not follow a strict pattern, always 
resulting in the same outcome. Nor is there such a thing as "the" archive. Instead, an 
archive, in most conceivable ways, is a composition. It is the task of modern day 
historians to find out what composition an archive is made of, firstly to describe it 
analytically, and secondly to make it accessible for others. 23 
It is at such insights that Laura Ann Stoler also has arrived. By studying Dutch 
colonial archives she has concluded that they offer more in terms of information than 
claimed by Guha. "Simply" reading against the grain effectively means still treating 
the archive as a "jailhouse"; a place of strict, constant and structural rules that, if 
studied consequently, will yield, however small, the echo of a subaltern voice once 
thought to be lost.24 Although this may be a truism of sorts, in many other cases there 
is more to gain if the archives are treated differently: 
'Archives are not stable "things" with ready-made and neatly drawn 
boundaries...I treat archival events more as moments that disrupt (if 
only provisionally) a field of force, that challenge (if only slightly) 
what can be said and done, that question (if only quietly) "epistemic 
                                                 
23 For a concise but very practical summary of the evolution of the debates on 
colonial studies and archives, see amongst others Benjamin Zachariah, 'Travellers 
in archives, or the possibilities of a post-post-archival historiography', Práticas da 
História 3 (2016). 
24 Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial 
Common Sense (Princeton 2009) 47. 
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warrant," that realign the certainties of the probable more than they 
mark wholesale reversals of direction.'25 
An archive, thus, is more than a mental "cage". Images of subalterns do appear at the 
forefront of many archival texts. And many of them are indeed a very subtle but 
powerful way of cornering any "object" not corresponding with colonial authority. 
But if anything, these images should be seen as rather unsuccessful attempts at doing 
so. It is due to their inherent instability that they are so created. 
What would this amount to in the Zanzibar case? Must the dispute about the burial 
ground be seen as a moment of disruption in the colonial force field? If so, then what 
are its boundaries? Does the dispute indeed challenge what can be said and done? Is 
this an instance of disturbance in the "epistemic warrant"? In order to find clues to the 
answer of these and other questions, a closer look at how Stoler comes to this 
conclusion may yet be helpful. Through their vast production of official 
documentation, so goes Stoler's argument, colonial administrations created a reality of 
the societies under their control as they understood it. The process by which these 
categories were produced is what has caught her interest: contrary to Subaltern 
Studies, she finds that their creation was an unfairly, opaque and overall refractory 
business. Despite, the training, schooling and moulding of civil servants into Imperial 
representatives, the outcome of this was never uniform, nor coherent. It is therefore 
problematic to think of colonial administrators as a group with (many) common 
denominators. This is an important insight offered by Stoler: different colonial 
officers understood reality in different ways and therefore produced different types of 
knowledge. Contrary to what Guha's monolithic approach suggests, these can be 
found in the archives. 
With regard to these archival files it is, generally speaking, not possible to retrieve 
the exact background and schooling of all the colonial civil servants whose 
contributions have ended up in the documents that will be analysed in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, their differences, as described above by Stoler, are an important starting 
point. Different backgrounds, she argues, lead to different interpretations. And indeed, 
there are several colonial officers involved in the case of the burial ground. This has 
been of influence on the contents of our archival material. As seen in the telegram, 
alongside what was written down as official truth, there was room for doubt, 
speculation, discussion, and indeed verity of a layered, stacked kind. The archives 
represented an order with great authority, but also one of which contemporary 
scholars have learnt that its truths are never straightforward.26 Every contemporary 
student and researcher of colonial history who enters the archives must account for 
this. 
But what would be a good way to proceed when making an attempt to uncover 
these differences? If colonial authorities indeed produced different realities, what 
then, should would these look like? What aspects of colonial rule specifically should 
be carefully scrutinized? Luckily, Stoler provides a sense of direction: 
                                                 
25 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain, 51. 
26 Ibidem, 1, 19, 20. 
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'This book describes how changes in directives and regulations - in an 
ever increasing attempt to control the lives of colonial subjects - 
reflected colonial administrators' constant changing perception of 
reality, dangers, categories.'27 
The dispute studied for this thesis seems to have its origins in such a change, namely 
the original agreement of 1899 and the apparent change in attitude of the Zanzibar 
authorities regarding the matter. It is this change in attitude that had been brought to 
the attention of the Aga Khan. He, as can be understood from the telegram, 
understood this change as a departure from "status quo". This indeed seems to be 
what had set the cogs of colonial record creation in motion. It was, to slightly 
paraphrase Stoler, the moment of disruption in the colonial force field.  
How, then, did Hardinge know that the information provided by the Aga Khan was 
"solid"? Indeed, alongside its primary function, the accumulation of written record, 
the colonial archive also represented the outcome of the way in which the internal and 
external parties involved in the muddy everyday dealings of colonial administration 
had (or had not) achieved their goals. The outcome of this depended on what Stoler 
calls a "hierarchy of credibility": the degree to which a source or informant could be 
trusted and thereby deeming the information relevant (or not). The degree of 
trustworthiness was largely determined by a certain "racial common sense"; an 
unspoken idea of how the world worked. But what these ideas were, differed from 
place, to time, to person. From the sources, Stoler points out, it is impossible to draw 
up one singular social structure.28 When carefully reading the telegram, it is perhaps 
possible to conclude that, although it is not exactly clear why, the Aga Khan was 
viewed by the Viceroy as a reliable source of information. The Shiïte imam stood high 
enough in the hierarchy for the Viceroy to "ask" for the "help" of other colonial 
officers of lower rank and status. It also meant that the Aga Khan could exert his 
influence to partly determine the contents of the archive. Furthermore, with regard to 
hierarchy, awareness of the aspect of differences between colonial officers is needed: 
for different colonial officers the same informant could probably have a different 
hierarchical status. 
The nature of the archive - an unstable collection of documents- and its origins - 
different colonial officers, a hierarchy of informants and law-induced content creation 
- was of influence on its contents. On the one hand, colonial archives can be viewed 
as a process of constant shift in understanding. No file was ever "finished"; it was 
simply waiting for a new addition. They could be used for control of every aspect: 
exploitation, development, security, economic welfare, religion; anything that 
"mattered". This, to Stoler, is one of the great insights of the laste decade in colonial 
research: 'pursuits of exploitation and enlightenment are not mutually exclusive but 
deeply entangled projects.'29 This is also a view that fits quite neatly into a framework 
that could give some more intelligibility to the telegram. Although the Viceroy's 
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28 Ibidem, 1, 22-24, 51. 
29 Ibidem, 3. 
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message is not explicitly one of exploitation, Stolers argument - multiple 
interpretations of one subject within the same archival stretch - is no less valuable. As 
seen in the sample text, there seem to be two interpretations with regard to the Aga 
Khan's status: one in which he is called "His Highness, and another in which he is "a 
useful asset". For the sake of illustration, let us give these perspectives names: Esteem 
and Utility. It may not even be hard to see how these perspectives are indeed not 
mutually exclusive. From the perspective of Esteem, the Aga Khan was, although a 
colonial subject, one that was regarded as being of high value. This had everything to 
do with his position as the spiritual head of the Shia Ismaïli sect. Since most Khoja's 
were indeed converted to Ismaïlism, the Aga Khan consequently had a position of 
great influence on this community of South Asian descent. Being on friendly footing 
with the Aga Khan meant the British could exert a certain amount of influence over a 
substantial group of colonial subjects, the Khoja's. Esteem and the second 
perspective, Utility, are therefore related to each other. Almost as if there existed a 
silent agreement; the Aga Khan was held in high regard, and able to influence certain 
aspects of colonial rule. The British, in return, received an instrument of sustained 
power and control. And from the telegram it is perhaps possible to deduce that the 
Aga Khan knew what he could and could not ask for. On the one hand they should be 
matters which concerned the welfare of his followers. This ensured their loyalty in the 
long run. On the other hand, he did not ask the British for something they could not 
give. Control over a small stretch of land in one of the smaller outposts of the Empire 
met both conditions. This insight also stands in stark contrast to Guha's assertion that 
archives were always and only a site of control. Under the right circumstances, 
colonial servants were able to influence their rulers. 
On the other hand, because of the constant shift in understanding and the 
perceived reliability of colonial administrator's informants, the colonial archive ended 
up being both a place of danger and confusion. The business of everyday could be 
changed into state affairs and issues of safety, disconnecting them from their original 
circumstance. Now, instead of being the mark of daily affairs, they were indicators of 
possible danger; more administrative meetings were organized accordingly, including 
orders to gather more intelligence so that earlier suspicions may be validated.30 It is, 
in the eyes of the author, one of the most striking features of the Viceroy's telegram. 
There was quite a bit of distance between Hardinge and Zanzibar town. And Zanzibar 
was not even part of his direct sphere of political influence. Yet, from a distance of 
over more than 3000 miles, Hardinge felt entitled to interfere into the daily business 
of colonial administration on this small island in front of the East African coast, 
thereby making the issue on the burial ground political. The danger here, in the eyes 
of Hardinge, was to lose a valuable asset, and thereby control, not just over the 
followers of the Aga Khan in Zanzibar, but also of those elsewhere in the Empire. If 
anything, this had to be prevented. The case of the burial ground had become a 
disrupted political force field, instigated by one of the Viceroy's informants, the Aga 
Khan, within the unsure circumstance of not knowing if his colleagues on the other 
side of the Indian ocean realized the risks at stake. Often, colonial officers knew if 
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they could "ask for assistance" when politicizing local matters from a certain distance. 
Stoler also realizes this: 
'expressions of sentiment depended on situated knowledge and thus 
relational know-how about rank--where and to whom one displayed 
one's range of feeling within that prescriptive world. Archival 
documents participate in this emotional economy'.31 
As noted before, Hardinge's telegram is quite demanding in tone. When literally 
reading the text, he did indeed ask his colleagues. There are, however, no 
questionmarks in his telegram. Hardinge being the Viceroy, he knew that, as one of 
the highest ranking officers in the empire, he could indeed "ask" for such interference. 
Also, when rereading the telegram as being part of an "emotional economy", it is 
striking how little in terms of emotion it conveys. The message, in other words, was 
not intended for those of equal or higher stature. Stoler thus sketches an image of 
colonial truth being like imperial formations themselves: temporary and in constant 
shift.32 Their most direct creators had different backgrounds, which caused their 
information to be produced, but perhaps more importantly, interpreted differently. The 
information provided by their informants was built upon a hierarchy that often found 
its base in racial or other modes of colonial thinking. Their content further depended 
on the estimated risk in cases of possible political interest, and the mutual relations 
between officers. 
Given that Stoler identifies the essence, the origins and the character of the 
archives to be so radically different from Guha's understanding of archives, she calls 
for a different methodology. Not because she thinks reading against the grain is never 
useful. Rather, she feels that other steps should be taken first. Such a method would 
require a student of colonial history 'to explore the grain with care and read along it 
first.'33 Taken together, the questions that need asking, and the work that needs doing 
before one should revert to "turning things upside down" are dubbed "reading along 
the grain"; a train of thought running in the "direction" of the source first. To explore 
and ascertain, before anything else and for as much as possible, its capacities. No 
student of colonial history should thus "blindy" take the risk of assuming colonial 
archives are a prison. 
Although Stolers work and analysis of colonial archives is based on Dutch 
colonial sources, the identification of the telegram sent by Viceroy Hardinge 
demonstrates that researchers of other colonialisms may also find her insights 
practicable. To sum up, the sources in this thesis can and will be used to 1) identify 
the different views, interpretations and opinions of the main actors in these files, with 
regard to the Mnazi Moja dispute, 2) understand how the conversations between the 
different colonial officers in these archives were part of an "emotional economy", 3) 
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demonstrate how the changed attitude of the Zanzibar colonial authorities had 
provoked the various parties to engage actively in the conflict 4) denote the role of the 
Aga Khan as a British informant of high status and credibility, 5) prove that images of 
colonial subjects are inconclusive, 6) appreciate that all of these factors taken together 
could turn a small and local event into a political affair and a matter of state security. 
The reflection above demonstrates that many of the insights provided by Stoler 
and Guha can help to place the content of File 748/1916 into a more suitable frame. In 
chapters two and three these will be further elucidated on the basis of the events 
around the Mnazi Moja grounds. 
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2. The Mnazi Moja Agreement of 1899 
The goal of this thesis is to deepen our understanding of the relationship between the 
Khojas, the Aga Khan and the British by studying the contested grounds of Mnazi 
Moja on the island Zanzibar during the period 1899-1912. In the first chapter, a 
reflection on the source material has resulted in the development of a method for 
properly rating and studying the primary sources from the India Office Records. The 
Mnazi Moja dispute of 1912 will be the main concern of the third chapter. This 
second chapter will analytically describe the events of 1899 leading up the Mnazi 
Moja agreement, as well as some of the relevant events in the years that followed. 
In the 36 years between the Aga Khan case and the Zanzibar agreement on Mnazi 
Moja, leadership over the Nizari Isma'ili's changed twice. Once in 1881 after the 
death of the first Aga Khan, and again in 1885 after untimely demise of the second. At 
the age of eight, the young Sultan Muhammad Shah was appointed Aga Khan III. If 
anything, the new Isma'ili imam first had to grow up. In 1899 he had reached this 
point. In 1885, his father had died of pneumonia after a long day of hunting in the 
rain.34 For the first time in almost fifteen years, the Isma'ili community at large could 
once more consider itself to be under the active leadership of its religious leader. It 
would not be long before the young Aga Khan would let himself be heard outside the 
borders of India. 
On 30 November 1899, George Hamilton of the India Office sent a despatch with 
number 139 to his superior, the Governor General of India. The file consisted of two 
parts. The first part contained a report by Basil S. Cave, Agent and Consul-General of 
the Island of Zanzibar concerning the negotiation and a resulting agreement with 
regard to the burial ground of Mnazi Moja and a copy of the actual agreement signed 
by all parties. The second, much smaller part contained a short report on the travels of 
the Aga Khan and his findings with regard to the state of the Indian community in 
German East Africa. The direct source of the latter was the Aga Khan himself, but his 
involvement in the creation of both was substantial.35 Most likely, despatch 139 was 
not unusual. The acting agent of the Crown, in this case located on the East African 
island of Zanzibar, reported to his superiors. These were not the employees of the 
Foreign Office. They had then sent the report to the India Office. As a person of 
interest to the Indian Government, the Aga Khan and his followers were the subject of 
reports that also reached the echelons of the Viceroy. It thus connected several places 
within the British colonial empire with each other, while at the same time showing 
part of its demarcations. Zanzibar, although historically an important location in the 
region, a relatively small outpost in the grand British empire; London, the empire's 
great metropole and home to many of the institutions in charge of colonial 
administration; Calcutta, the centre of administration under British controlled India. 
Although there were similarities, both the receiving parties had their own logic for 
justifying the acquirement of such a report. The Aga Khan was a prominent Indian 
subject; the leader of an important Muslim sect, the Nizari Isma'ili's. And he was 
                                                 
34 Daftary, The Ismailis, 480. 
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File 2280, Aga Khan to Basil Cave, 30-09-1899. 
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young. Gaining his trust at this early stage was - to some degree - a guarantee for 
stability within the colonial system. From there, both offices parted. To the Foreign 
Office, the Aga Khan was, even at his young age, a player in international politics. 
His followers were not only present in British controlled areas, but also in places 
under the control of rival nations, such as Germany and Russia. To the India office, 
following the movements of the Aga Khan was more of a natural given. He was after 
all an Indian subject. And his travels, especially to places within the region of the 
Indian Ocean, to other subjects also of Indian origins were well within its sphere of 
influence. Within these boundaries reports on activities of such an influential 
individual as the Aga Khan were a prerogative.36 
For both the Aga Khan and Basil Cave settling the matter of Mnazi Moja 
presented opportunity. If the Aga Khan was able to let all parties involved come to 
reconciliation, Cave would have the privilege of sending a report of this success to his 
superiors. It, of course, had to be just right. Cave would need to demonstrate that he 
was a subject matter expert, capable of dealing with such a complex issue while at the 
same time remaining concise and punctual. For the Aga Khan triumph would mean a 
first success on the international stage. Showing the British that he could be of use for 
them could have all sorts of advantages. For himself, perhaps, but also for all of his 
followers within the British empire. His predecessors, especially his grandfather, had 
from the very beginning maintained cordial relations with the British. It was now time 
for Sultan Muhamma Shah to do the same. But it was not just the fact that the Aga 
Khan was involved that had caused several colonial officers to circulate these 
documents. And not Basil Cave, but others before him, had already established that 
the settlement that had now been made represented the closure of a matter that had 
lasted for several decades. Indeed, the dispute about the Mnazi Moja burial ground 
was, in many ways, the result of the ruling in the Aga Khan case of 1866. Its legal 
reality was gradually being applied to places as far away from Bombay as Zanzibar.37 
Cave was well aware of this and for that reason eager to demonstrate his 
knowledge concerning Mnazi Moja and the arrival of the Aga Khan. He informed his 
superiors that there existed a larger context which had to be taken into account. 
Settling the matter also meant entering the force field that had led to the court case of 
1866 and then finalizing it for the island of Zanzibar. He was, on the other hand, not 
the first Zanzibar administrator confronted with the issue of Mnazi Moja. Sir John 
Kirk, one of his highly regarded predecessors, had already concluded as early as 1870 
that the burial ground was the subject of conflict.38 Many parties claimed its control. 
Most of these were Khojas. The origins of their claim lay with the procurement of 
Mnazi Moja by Mahomed Meru, presumably a Sunni Khoja from Surat. But when this 
had happened exactly, and who was entitled to the use of the cemetery, nobody could 
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tell for certain. The most important evidence for it, the deed showing the ownership of 
the property and its exact purpose, had been all but lost: 
'The claims of the Khojas rest on the purchase of the property some 
sixty or seventy years ago, in the reign of Seyyid Said, by Mahomed 
Meru from Surat, who, on his death, dedicated it to the service, for 
burial purposes, of all members of the Khoja community. The deed 
passed by Mahomed Meru has unfortunately been lost.... although there 
can be no doubt that it was once in existence'39 
If Cave could be sure of anything, it was that things had changed for the Khoja 
community since the times of Meru. On the island of Zanzibar there existed four 
groups of Khojas: Isma'ilis, Sunnis, Bhagats and the Shia Thenasharias. The first 
three sections got along quite easily. According to Cave, it was practically impossible 
to tell the difference between the Isma'ilis and the Bhagats. The Sunni's were but a 
small minority within the total of the community.40 
Strife between the former and latter groups, the Isma'ilis and Shia Thenasharias, 
was the cause of communal tension. The latter group had been resistant of the 
leadership claims of the Aga Khan. To the Isma'ili Khojas, they were seceders, 
unwilling to acknowledge the imam's position. By giving up their Isma'ili faith, the 
Thenasharia's were no longer considered to be Khojas. Since they were not Khojas, 
they were not entitled to the use of the burial ground. The Thenasharia's, however, 
claimed that Mnazi Moja grounds could not be claimed by any party. They were 
communal grounds, accessible to all muslims on the island.41 
Cave knew that it was exactly this issue that had produced the Aga Khan case in 
1866, and that it had been decided in the favour of the Aga Khan and his followers. 
So far, the position of the Isma'ilis was clear: within the boundaries of India, the 
Khojas were considered to be Isma'ilis by the colonial system. The problem lay with 
those Khojas that had chosen to build a living on the shores of the Indian Ocean. The 
matter at hand was to establish how to proceed with regard to the Khoja community 
of Zanzibar. Althought the Shia Thenasharias had also established their own cemetery 
- a most practical solution - the claims of the belligerent parties had been the cause of 
several clashes. Members of the Shia Thenasharias had drawn up their will prior to 
the take-over of the Aga Khan, ordering to be buried at Mnazi Moja. This, of course, 
was unacceptable to the Isma'ili Khoja's.42 
Claims of control over Mnazi Moja, however, did not only come from within the 
Khoja community itself. Since it was one of the few open spaces of land near 
Zanzibar Town the Zanzibar government was also a party of interest. During an 
outbreak of cholera, John Kirk had prevented the unearthing of two American sailors 
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who had been buried at Mnazi Moja as a result of prevention measures. Such a use of 
the burial ground was considered unacceptable by the members of the Khoja Jamat, 
especially since they had not given their explicit permission to do so. Later, Kirk had 
stopped the Zanzibar Sultan from seizing the land and erecting buildings on it. In 
1893, another predecessor of Cave, sir Arthur Hardinge, had stopped the Khoja's from 
building a wall around the cemetery. He had even attempted to discuss the matter with 
the leading members of the community, but had failed to come to an agreement that 
suited all the parties. Mnazi Moja, in other words, was a speck of land sought after by 
many.43 
As a representative of the Zanzibar authorities, the Consul-General could not 
simply leave Mnazi Moja to the Khoja's. The cemetery covered only the northern 
section. At that side, it was surrounded by a wall. To the south the burial ground was 
not closed off. This had presented the authorities with a problem. The southern part of 
Mnazi Moja was being used by other communities of Zanzibar - Europeans and other 
Indians - as recreational space: 
'[Here,] all the European and many of the Indian and Native residents 
take their exercise; the road from four o'clock in the afternoon until 
sunset is crowded with horses, carriages, bicycles, and pedestrians, 
while on the grass games of cricket and golf are usually in progress, 
and a ridge which faces the sea is a favourite resting-place for those 
who wish to escape for a short time from the stifling atmosphere of the 
Town.'44 
Playing ball games such as cricket or golf in the vicinity of a burial ground was 
probably not an elegant combination. It was a local clash of traditional religious 
custom versus modern leisure activities. These local interests also had to be taken into 
account. It meant that the burial ground could not keep on growing, as it would then 
take up space on a location used for recreation. Since Zanzibar was but a small island 
and Zanzibar town already growing out of its joints such real estate was a rare 
commodity. The burial of the followers of the Aga Khan at Mnazi Moja had to be 
contained. Relocation in the long term was inevitable. 
Soon after the arrival of the Aga Khan it became clear to Cave that the religious 
leader of the prime section of the Khoja community was well informed. This was 
useful information to those at the Foreign and India offices. If the Aga Khan was 
indeed an informant, or perhaps even more, with influence and capabilities, he might 
be deployable in other matters as well. Cave knew this, and he saw a young man eager 
and ready to get to work. 45 
The young Aga Khan proved his use. He did not leave until there was a solutions 
that seemed sound, durable and feasible. An agreement was hammered out during a 
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period of negotiations that lasted for almost three months. The imam had a leading 
role for all parties. Cave was convinced that it would not have come to such a 
successful ending without the input of the Aga Khan: 
'The Ismailis were very obstinate, and at one time I was afraid that Aga 
Khan's influence, great as it is, would be insufficient to bring about the 
end that we had in view, but at length, after many meetings had been 
held and numerous proposals, and counter-proposals made and 
discussed, an arrangement was effected and embodied in the agreement 
of which I have the honour to enclose a copy herewith.'46 
It had been the Aga Khan who had thus gotten the Isma'ili Khojas in line. The other 
groups, however, had not been at the negotiating table. Why, and how they had been 
excluded as participants, at the least in the Consul-General's report, is unclear. What 
on the other hand was clear, is that they were given a lower status relative to the 
followers of the Aga Khan. They were forced to give up their right to access the 
cemetery: 
'I obtained letters at the same time from the recognised heads of the 
Shia Thenasharia and of the Sunni Khoja sects, resigning any claims 
that they might have to the land which has been given up under this 
settlement, and I trust therefore that a question which has for many 
years given rise to a great deal of trouble and unpleasantness has now 
been finally and satisfactorily adjusted.'47 
How and why the leaders of the other Khoja groups had accepted the renunciation of 
their rights to Mnazi Moja, Cave did not mention to his superiors. Given his earlier, 
rather thorough description of the conflict, and thereby placing it within the larger 
context of the Aga Khan case, this is a somewhat surprising omission. It was in line 
with expectations that, the Thenasharias at the least, would not have accepted such a 
defeat without a fight. But perhaps it was also the easiest and most workable solution 
for Cave. He had met the Aga Khan and from his report it becomes clear that he was 
impressed by the personality of the young spiritual leader. Furthermore, the British 
court of Bombay had already given a clear ruling in favour of the Aga Khan. 
Questioning its accuracy, at this stage, in the presence of the current Aga Khan, with a 
clear and formal solution for grabs, required Cave to go against the legal reality that 
was most likely also accepted by his superiors. It seems Cave was not prepared to do 
this. 
And so the matter was resolved. The Khojas had been forced by the Aga Khan to 
accept his leadership, and he had steered through restless waters of graveyard 
contention. Cave had used the legal reality of the ruling of the original Aga Khan case 
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as a condition for determining who was entitled to access of the Mnazi Moja burial 
ground. All this had been trimmed down to an "agreement" with clear conditions and 
demarcations. As such would it be remembered by the Aga Khan in his biography: 
'Between these official and my followers there had arisen a 
complicated dispute, which concerned the ownership and tenure of a 
tract of land on the seashore, whose value had rapidly increased, but 
which was an Ismaili burial ground. The dispute had been stubborn and 
protracted. I was able, however, to arrange a settlement which was 
admittedly a compromise.....there had never been any other major 
dispute between major dispute between the Ismailis and the British 
authorities.'48 
In hindsight, these remarks by the Aga Khan deserve a careful reconsideration when 
taking into account recent insights in the field of Khojas studies. Whatever the precise 
origins of the Mnazi Moja grounds were, it certainly was not an Isma'ili burial ground 
as the Aga Khan implied. The conflict was also not only between his followers and 
the officials. Instead, the Aga Khan had used the matter of Mnazi Moja to rewrite the 
story of the Khojas into Isma'ili history. How had he done it? Why had the Isma'ili 
Khojas, who had been fighting for Mnazi Moja for decades, accepted the agreement? 
The key seems to have been the exclusive access they had been given to the burial 
grounds. It would even be extended for another ninety yards to the south. In return, 
the government would build a wall on the south side, fully enclosing the grave site on 
all sides. The Isma'ili Khojas on their part had renounced all control over the 
remainder of Mnazi Moja. The government on the other hand was not allowed to do 
with the land whatever it pleased. The agreement included a section explicitly 
describing what could and what could not be done. The parties had agreed that the 
remainder of Mnazi Moja could only be used for purposes of leisure. No buildings 
would be allowed to be permanently built on the site, for leisure or otherwise with 
one, clear exception: in case of the danger of flooding the government was allowed to 
provide for suitable protection in the form of a seawall: 
'The Government hereby undertake that the land lying on the westerly 
side of the said M'nazi Moja road and to the east and south of the 
ground in or upon which the right of the Khojas to bury their dead has 
been confirmed and limited shall for ever hereafter be kept open as a 
recreation or pleasure ground and no buildings except those suitable for 
recreation pleasure ground or ornamental purposes or for protection 
against encroachments of the sea shall be erected thereon.'49 
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It was the kind of solution the officers of the British Empire could be satisfied with. 
Created by an actor of relative inexperience. He had acted as a representative of 
British interests. To Cave, such a feat was unusual. The Aga Khan, therefore, had to 
be recommended. He could prove to be a useful informant, perhaps capable of 
providing his services in other instances. He concluded his report with a firm 
endorsement: 
'I cannot conclude this report without bringing to your Lordship's 
notice the very loyal and valuable assistance which I have received 
from Aga Khan during the progress of these negotiations. His 
Highness' position as the head of the Ismaili Khoja community is 
dependent to a considerable extent on the sentimental and religious 
fervour of his adherents, and is naturally therefore a somewhat 
precarious one, but he did not hesitate to strain his authority to the 
utmost, and to risk his popularity and consequently his hopes of 
financial support, in the endeavour to find a reasonable solution of the 
difficulty, and to induce his followers to accept it. I am not going too 
far when I say that, if it had not been for his disinterested co-operation, 
there would have been, if any, only the remotest chance of our object 
being successfully accomplished. I would venture to request that the 
part which His Highness has played in these negotiations may be 
brought to the notice of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.'50 
The Consul-General of Zanzibar shared his enthusiasm for a new asset that could be 
of benefit to the Empire. He had proven to be loyal to the British cause and he had 
provided some valuable assistance. His status, from the perspective of Cave, was that 
of a new but promising colonial subject. However, it would not be possible to 
approach the Indian Secretary of State directly. Such a move would not be 
appropriate. He would certainly endorse the Aga Khan, but by asking his own direct 
commanding officers to bring over his recommendations. In turn, they would then 
convey the message of approval to their colleagues of the Indian government by use 
the proper channels. 
The second part of the despatch sent by Cave contained a small report based on a 
letter sent by the Aga Khan to the Consul-General, regarding the imam's visit to 
German East Africa. It too was sent to the Indian government. His first stop was 
British controlled Mombassa. The Aga Khan then travelled to Dar-es-Salam. There 
the Aga Khan had also addressed issues of conflict between the Shia Thenasharia and 
Isma'ili Khojas. After solving these, he left East Africa for Egypt.51 Although Basil 
Cave knew that the Aga Khan went to such places as Dar-es-Salam, his information 
on these was much more limited. Whatever the actions undertaken by the Aga Khan in 
German occupied East Africa, the Consul-General had no other option than to use the 
intelligence given to him by an informant trusted by the colonial system. But given 
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the earlier experience, in which Cave had closely witnessed how the Aga Khan 
operated, Cave seemed to have enough confidence in the capabilities of the Isma'ili 
leader. And if the Aga Khan went to visit his followers in rival German East Africa, 
Cave knew that his superiors were eager to be informed about this. These East African 
followers of the imam were of Indian descent, and as such British colonial subjects. 
The British colonial system had even determined their religious background. Their 
presence in East Africa had not been a problem to the British. This had permanently 
changed in 1885, with the establishment of a German colony. Places such as Dar-es-
Salam had harboured Khojas - and later Isma'ilis - for well over a century. The 
German takeover had now placed these British colonial subjects under German 
control.52 
The outcome for the main actors in Cave's report - himself and the Aga Khan - 
must have been a positive one for both. The former could provide those of the higher 
official echelons with two valuable reports. One in which a long standing, albeit local 
problem had finally been resolved and another providing information about a rival 
nation. Furthermore, the Consul-General could claim the introduction of a rather 
useful informant. To the Aga Khan, the outcome was equally positive. He had proven 
himself to be a capable negotiator, able to crunch down a deal in harsh conditions 
between rivalling groups, seemingly without losing his own position of authority. 
Moreover, as an informant and supporter of the British, he was uniquely positioned. 
Entering the game of colonial politics, the Aga Khan certainly did not hold the lowest 
position in the hierarchy. 
The Mnazi Moja Agreement therefore solved two issues. Firstly, it had settled a 
very practical problem that had existed between several groups on the island. It was 
now clear where the cemetery ended and where leisure grounds began. Secondly, and 
much more to the importance of the Aga Khan, the agreement of 1899 solidified the 
ruling of the Aga Khan case. Since 1866, not much had happened with regard to it. 
Sultan Muhammad Shah's grandfather had been too old to continue battle. His father 
had not been given the time to do so. Now, in 1899, through a dispute over a small 
piece of land, the new Aga Khan was able to go ahead with what his grandfather had 
begun. It was an important step, for it anchored the imam's position outside the 
borders of India, but within the legal borders of the British empire. By removing the 
other Khoja groups from the negotiation table, the Aga Khan had been able the further 
delineate the characteristics of his followers. 
The years following the Mnazi Moja agreement of 1899 were marked by several 
changes in the Isma'ili Khoja community under control of the Aga Khan. They 
developed cordial relations with the British elite. On "special" occasions, meetings 
between the prominent members of both communities were organised at the main 
community building of the Khoja's, the jamat khana. The arrival or departure of a 
Consul-General, a judge or another important member of the colonial elite was 
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sufficient cause for a convivial gathering.53 In addition, the jamat khana was also the 
place of gathering for the Jamat: the traditional assembly of men ruling the 
community. The Jamat had an important function. It controlled finances and 
communal property. It was the ultimate authority in case of internal strife or other 
social matters. Those members of the community who were members of the Jamat, 
were highly respected.54 It had been the members of the Jamat who had signed the 
agreement in 1899. These were the men that sat at the negotiating table with the 
representatives of the Zanzibar government alongside the Aga Khan. Upon arrival, he 
had personally appointed them. After the tough negotiations that had lasted for two 
and a half months they, as representatives of the Isma'ili Khoja community, had all 
placed their signatures under the final agreement.55 
The Aga Khan had remembered that it had taken him a long time to conclude 
negotiations in a manner favourable to all parties. The problem was that the men of 
the Jamat had pushed their possibilities to the limit. As representatives of the 
community, they had battled every tiny little detail for as far as they possibly could. 
Under the traditional rules of the community, the Jamat was in a position to do so. 
This kind of autonomy, the Aga Khan felt, could potentially be dangerous to his 
position. The imam was not willing to enter long term negotiations every time a local 
group of his followers had gotten involved in a conflict. Furthermore, there were still 
too many customary rules - for example with regard to government - that still 
resembled the old, undivided Khoja community. This made things unclear. If the Aga 
Khan was to rule the Khojas over great distances, he had to make sure that those 
Khojas governing the local communities were loyal to him and willing to execute his 
will.  
A few years after 1899, the young Aga Khan had drawn his conclusions. He 
needed a firmer grip on his followers. More separation between them and other 
seceding Khojas was needed. In the years that followed he therefore conceived a 
constitution. Central to this Isma'ili constitution was the council: an administrative 
institution that would handle all matters concerning the community. Members of the 
council were not chosen by the community as had been the Khoja custom for 
generations.56 Instead, they were chosen by the Aga Khan. This put the traditional 
administrative structure of the Jamat out of play. Since all members were 
representatives of the Aga Khan, decisions would always favour the outcome as he 
desired. The council, now kept on the leash of the Aga Khan, was far less autonomous 
as a power structure compared to the old Jamat. It would also be less prone to dissent, 
or so the young imam hoped. Gradually, his followers were to become increasingly 
less like the Khojas their ancestors had been. The tenets of Nizari Isma'ilism had been 
                                                 
53  Sir John Kirk: Welcome and Farewell’, East African Standard (03-14-1903) 5; 
'Zanzibar News’ East African Standard (03-24-1903) 5. 
54  Purohit, The Aga Khan Case, 25. 
55  IOR/L/PJ/6/525 File 2280, Mnazi Moja Agreement, 15-09-1899. 
56 Amiji, ‘Some Notes’, 614. 
28 
 
Persian of origin. Indian caste practices such as those of the Jamat were not part of 
that. 
With regard to the Mnazi Moja agreement, things would not be quiet for long. 
Based on statements by Cave's successor, Edward Clarke, the Zanzibar government 
broke the Mnazi Moja agreement approximately in the years 1907. It would thus be 
the changed views of Basil Cave, one of the prime guardians of the original 
agreement, that would lead to a first infringement.57 Cave seemed to have had the 
need for the adoption of the latest available technologies for wireless 
telecommunication so that close contact with the African mainland and other offices 
in charge of colonial administration could easily be maintained. The old despatches 
and reports, sent by mail, usually took weeks to arrive. The new technology meant 
that messages could be conveyed almost instantly, at 20 words per minute. 
A location for a wireless telegraph station was therefore needed. Such a structure 
needed to be built in the close vicinity of the offices of government officials. For 
optimal reception of wireless telegraph signals, the station needed to stand clear of 
other buildings. In his report on the original Mnazi Moja agreement, Cave had already 
noted that it was 'the only open piece of ground available' within the limits of 
Zanzibar town.58 And thus there was only one place where both conditions for the 
structure were met: the Mnazi Moja grounds. Cave was very much aware of the fact 
that the agreement forbade the building of any kind of structure for other purposes 
than leisure. But he needed an open piece of land for his new plans. He seemingly 
estimated that not much would come of it if he claimed part of it for the greater good 
of Zanzibar. Change was thus due to come to Zanzibar. Its old economic and political 
structures were to be replaced by modern tools more in tune with the velocity, 
extensity, intensity and impact of the modern age.59 Older, more traditional structures, 
such as the religious customs of a local group of colonial subjects, could never 
withhold such developments. 
No documents have so far been found that can shed a direct light on the reaction 
of the Khojas to the erection of a building by the government on Mnazi Moja. Given 
its turbulent history it is not unlikely that breaking the agreement led to renewed 
anger and distrust. 
Cave remained Consul-General until 1909. In that year he would be positioned 
elsewhere. On 13 April 1909 it was announced in the London Gazette that Basil 
Shillito Cave was appointed Consul-General of Algeria. He would be stationed at its 
capital Algiers.60 His successor, Edward Clarke, followed the direction that was 
deployed by Cave, but his new position may have driven him into taking the new 
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modernisation efforts one step further. After taking office, Clarke had learnt that the 
Khojas were in fact renting out the remainder of the Mnazi Moja lands when 
festivities or other social activities were held. After studying the agreement of 1899, 
Clarke had concluded that this itself was an infringement on the agreement. By a new 
decree, number 8 of 1910, he prohibited any party other than the government of 
Zanzibar to rent out the lands.61 
The new decree especially differed from the original agreement on one crucial 
aspect: the remainder of the Mnazi Moja grounds. Contrary to the original agreement, 
in which the parties involved had agreed that the remainder of the land would only be 
used for purposes of leisure, the Mnazi Moja decree of 1910 held that the government 
of Zanzibar was entitled to the use of the land for any purpose it deemed necessary. In 
practice, this meant that the authorities would be able to build any structure for any 
purpose: 
[The Zanzibar Government is allowed] '(d.) To erect or remove any 
water pipe, shed, or any structure whatsoever that may reasonably be 
necessary.' 
(f.) 'To fence off, enclose, or in any way prohibit the public from using, 
for a reasonable time, any part thereof.' 
(g.) 'To let for any public purpose at such rent, if any, as they think fit 
any part thereof for any reasonable time.'62 
Again Mnazi Moja was at the forefront of Zanzibar politics. In the ten years since the 
agreement, things had not been quiet. Cave had left. The Aga Khan had implemented 
his Isma'ili reforms. No other group of Khoja thought of renewing their claim on the 
grounds. But while the old feuds had been buried, a new one rose to the fore. First by 
breaking the agreement so that a wireless station could be built, then by a new decree, 
an attempt was started at the creation of a new reality. 
To conclude, in 1899, the young Aga Khan III actively took over the role of leader 
of the Isma'ili Khojas. He had positioned at the negotiating table because of his legal 
an religious status as leader of the Nizari Isma'ilis. Several parties within the British 
colonial apparatus were interested in his movements for various reasons. The Aga 
Khan started off as an informant who passed on information via the Consul-General 
of Zanzibar. Having made the agreement, the imam showed that he possessed useful 
capacities. Basil Cave recommended the Aga Khan as agent and informant to the 
secretary of state for India. Cave was aware that the Khojas and the Aga Khan were 
historically and legally tied to each other because of the Aga Khan case of 1866. 
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Although Cave mentions the presence of several groups of Khojas, and that the 
original owner of Mnazi Moja probably was a Sunni, only the Isma'ili Khojas took 
part in the creation of the Mnazi Moja agreement. Most likely, Cave regarded an 
agreement with just the Isma'ili Khojas as the most feasible solution to the problem. 
He thus followed the legal reality of the case of 1866. The agreement therefore was 
also a way of affirming its outcome. This is confirmed when also taking into 
consideration the writings from the biography of Aga Khan III. Cave valued the Aga 
Khan as a new, loyal and promising informant of the British empire, albeit without 
ever losing out of sight that he still regarded the Isma'ili leader as a colonial subject 
who could do no more than to provide "valuable assistance". Given his earlier 
experiences with the imam he trusted the information the Aga Khan had sent him with 
regard to his journey to German East Africa. 
By dissolving the old structure of the Jamat, the Aga Khan hoped to gradually 
reform the Khojas, turning them more and more into the followers of the Persian faith 
and custom he wanted them to be. At the same time, it was the most practical solution 
if he was to lead all Isma'ilis. Even in the fast modernising early twentieth century, 
the Aga Khan could not be everywhere at once. 
Most likely, it was Basil Cave that first broke the Mnazi Moja agreement by 
building a telegraph station on the grounds. This change in attitude was continued by 
Edward Clarke by issuing a new "Mnazi Moja Decree" in 1910. It would be matter of 
time before the old conflict would resurface once more. This was exactly what 
happened in 1912. 
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3. The Mnazi Moja Dispute of 1912 
The third chapter of this thesis builds on the insights from the previous chapters. 
Chapter one has showed the development of a method for properly studying and 
assessing the content of the source material. Chapter two has sketched the background 
and events leading up to the renewed outbreak of a conflict revolving the grounds of 
Mnazi Moja. This last and third chapter will be used to describe and analyse the 
events of the Mnazi Moja dispute as it flared up once more throughout the year 1912. 
Early in the year 1912 Edward Clarke, Consul-General and Agent of the Crown 
for the island of Zanzibar, received a telegram from his colleagues at the Foreign 
Office in London. They were not the original senders of the message. Instead, they 
were passing on a request from Charles Hardinge, Viceroy of India who was asking 
him on behalf of the Aga Khan to reverse his Mnazi Moja decree of 1910. 
'Since 1910 the Zanzibar Government has disturbed the status quo by 
letting out the lands for stalls and cinematographs, and actually receive 
payment for them. All that he ask is that the status quo of 1899-1909 
may be maintained'.63 
By the look of it, Edward Clarke had made a miscalculation. Such a highly placed 
officer as the Viceroy would usually not interfere in a local matter. How had he ended 
up in this situation? Unawareness of the agreement of 1899 and the associated court 
case of 1866 was improbable. Under normal circumstances, Clarke would have been 
informed about such arrangements as the Mnazi Moja agreement. The creation of his 
own decree of 1910 was almost impossible without knowledge of the prior. In all 
likelihood, Clarke had very seriously misapprehended the political status of the Mnazi 
Moja grounds. It had slipped past his attention that the Khojas, who may have seemed 
like "ordinary" caste Indians to him, were in fact the followers of the Aga Khan. If 
this was the case, he had underestimated their political influence and associated 
status.It had been two and a half years since his appointment in 1909. On 16 August 
1910 he had issued the Mnazi Moja decree. Now, almost a year and a half later, he 
was rebuffed by an outranking officer. 
The Aga Khan had started a career as British political agent. In 1899, he did not 
yet have a voice of his own. British officers such as Basil Cave had pleaded on his 
behalf. In the years that followed, he had grown into a British loyalist of higher status. 
Colonial officers still pleaded on his behalf, but these were no longer the local 
governors of the smaller East African parts of the Empire. Instead, the Viceroy now 
took action to represent his interests. 
Contrary to Cave who had sent messages to the government of India in the exact 
opposite direction, Clarke now found himself on the receiving end. A telegram was 
sent to the Foreign Office. Confirmation of its reception was dated 9 February.64 It is 
unknown when the request reached the Wireless station of Zanzibar. His response was 
                                                 
63 IOR/L/PS/10/588/2, Viceroy to Foreign Office, 08-02-1912. 
64 Ibidem. 
32 
 
received 6 days after the initial telegram had been sent, on 14 February. At 3.55 p.m. 
he sent his reaction from Zanzibar. At 6.30 p.m., the message was received. Clarke 
was alarmed. He had not anticipated that an agreement over a small and seemingly 
vacant lot could be the cause of the harassment of such an important player as the 
leader of the Isma'ilis. Since 1899 a wall had been built. This had been stipulated in 
the original agreement. To Clarke it may have looked like the remaining land was free 
for use. A friendly request by the Viceroy came as a wake-up call. He had disturbed 
the status quo by renting out these grounds. The newly appointed Consul-General 
urged to explain why he felt it was justifiable to rent Mnazi Moja on behalf of the 
government. Informed about the original agreement Clarke explained that under 
clause three, the Khojas had renounced all entitlement to the remainder of Mnazi 
Moja.65 If clause three was indeed isolated from the other parts of the agreement, such 
a conclusion seemed fair: 
‘The Khojas hereby renounce and for ever give up and relinquish all 
claim to or right title or interest in the residue of the said land which is 
outside of and not included in the boundaries of the said piece or parcel 
of land, hereinbefore more particularly described and delineated on the 
said plan and thereon surrounded with a red line.'66 
That Clarke isolated one clause of the whole agreement is problematic. By clause 
three the Zanzibar government was not entitled to act as it saw fit for the remainder of 
the ground. This most likely had been one of the fears of the Khoja negotiators in 
1899, and therefore it was agreed upon that under clause seven, the ground would not 
be used for other purposes then recreational activities. Somehow, Clarke failed to 
mention this to his superiors. Given the fact the he was aware of the original 
agreement, and that the agreement itself is no more than seven clauses long, the latter 
being the one in which is mentioned what the government was allowed to do with the 
remainder of Mnazi Moja, such an omission leaves room for speculation. An obvious 
reason would be that, if the Viceroy would be informed of clause seven, Clarke would 
be called to order. Instead, he chose to make the Viceroy none the wiser. Telegraphic 
communication made things easier in this respect. It was now possible to ask "quick" 
questions, faster and over greater distances. This did not mean that a full picture was 
always given. Cave was still for a large part in control over the information that was 
handed over to the Viceroy, and he used this smartly. If the Viceroy had no other 
channels, perhaps things could still work out well. 
After reassuring the Viceroy that the burial grounds had never been touched, 
Clarke went a step further. Through channels not mentioned in the telegraph, Clarke 
had indeed learnt that the Khojas were charging rent for the use of the remainder of 
Mnazi Moja. This was never part of the agreement and as such should be corrected. 
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'it..... came to my knowledge that they [the Khojas] had... continued to 
charge rents for stalls which are always erected there on public 
holidays and for cinematograph tents at other times. On learning this I 
directed that in future such rents should be paid to the credit of 
Mnazimoja account as provided in section 3 of decree No. 8, 1910.'67 
The decree, drafted 16 August 1910, indeed contained a section number three with 
such a statement. In it, the Zanzibar government claimed that it was the only party 
allowed to rent the land. At the end of each year, the revenue and expenditures of the 
grounds would be published.68 Clarke hoped that this would be a sufficient 
explanation to the Viceroy. The problem was that Clarke gave a version of events that 
isolated sections from the agreement of 1899 and his own decree from 1910. In the 
case of the former, clause three could not be understood without taking into 
consideration clause seven. In the case of the latter, he framed section three in such a 
manner that it looked as if he had no other option than to correct one of the flaws of 
the earlier agreement of 1899, and that the Khojas had been the cause of this. 
But under the Mnazi Moja agreement, no party had the right to rent lands, neither 
the Khojas, nor the government. "Fixing this" in a new decree by renting out the land 
on behalf of the government was an infringement on the original agreement. 
Furthermore, section one of the decree of 1910 contained several subsections that 
were in themselves a violation of the Mnazi Moja agreement. It allowed the 
government to build structures as it saw fit, and explicitly mentioned the government 
as the only party allowed to rent out the land.69 Neither of these measures were ever 
agreed upon by the different parties in 1899. This could also be put into good use, for 
it drew attention away from something not mentioned in the Viceroy's message: that 
the original agreement had already been broken when a wireless telegraphic station 
was built on the Mnazi Moja grounds. Since Clarke had already shown that he knew 
the exact content, most likely he was also aware that he, as the representative of the 
Zanzibar government, had also not kept his side of the deal. 
It seems neither party fully kept to their side of the agreement. The Khojas 
however, had made the first move by instantly playing their biggest asset, the Aga 
Khan. Clarke on the other hand had responded quite excellently by framing the old 
agreement and the new decree in such a manner that could only be explained in way 
that pointed to the Khojas as the cause of the problems. 
Clarke thus played a game of high stakes. He was up against a man - the Viceroy - 
that outranked him considerably, and an important British loyalist. By making smart 
use of the legal documents he had access to, he hoped to outmanoeuvre them. He had 
a small information lead. Perhaps he could use it to his own advantage and still get his 
way. To Clarke, Mnazi Moja was a local Zanzibar affair. He felt he had played 
according to the rules (or perhaps bent them a little). It was now a matter of 
convincing his correspondents. But the Consul-General was also caught by surprise. 
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The Khojas had never approached him directly on the matter, but had gone straight to 
their religious head in order to address the matter. This had also been the cause of 
discontentment: 
'I have received absolutely no complaint as to “general treatment” of 
Aga Khan’s followers, and am quite at a loss to understand what they 
mean. I would urge them their duty as British subjects is to lay any 
grievances they may have before me and would earnestly deprecate any 
encouragement being given to them to go straight either to Home or 
Indian Government without first coming to agency, a course which can 
only result in shaking my position and causing delay.'70 
Clarke realised that he needed to operate cautiously. These were not the kind of men 
he wanted to be on bad terms with. If the citizens of Zanzibar were no longer 
approaching him directly to address their grievances, this was potentially dangerous 
for his leadership position, not only on the island itself, but also because of the image 
that arose of his capabilities. As a local governor, he was supposed to solve problems 
for those in higher ranks, not be the cause of them. A certain humility was therefore 
needed. Apparently the Khojas were prone the influence of the Aga Khan. At that 
moment, Clarke did not fully understand why they had not approached him with their 
grievances. Perhaps it was not wise to approach them too direct. If reconciliation 
between himself on the Khojas was needed, he would probably do wise to ask for 
permission to do so, and then report this to his superiors: 
In order to go fully into matter for purpose of report I ought to call 
council, if possible, before me, speaking to them in the sense of above 
and asking them what they have to say. May I do so?71 
If Clarke was given permission to talk to them, he would approach the Khoja council. 
The council was a relatively new Isma'ili institution that had been founded by the Aga 
Khan seven years earlier. It was the result of the personal wish of Sultan Muhammad 
Shah to modernize the communities of his followers while at the same time 
strengthening his own leadership position. The traditional Jamat of 1899, the one of 
which its members had been at the negotiating table, had been dissolved. It had been 
replaced by a body under the complete control of the Aga Khan. They only acted on 
his explicit consent and wishes. Now it seemed not only the Isma'ili Khojas were 
waiting for the demands of their spiritual head. The Consul-General also estimated 
that it would be wise to await His Highness' permission. Talking to the Khojas 
without it in this stage could perhaps have severe repercussions. The introduction of a 
administrative system based on councils was not limited to Zanzibar. In other Isma'ili 
communities who during the nineteenth century had settled along the shores of the 
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Indian ocean, similar councils had been introduced. In practice, it generally meant 
that in the places where the Khojas had settled, their old Jamat structures were 
replaced by an "Isma'ili" council. They could be found in the British, Portuguese, and 
French colonies of East Africa, in Uganda, Portuguese East Africa, Madagascar, 
Natal, the Cape colony, Burma and Malaya.72 
At a first glance, these first two telegrams in File 748/1916 Pt 2 The Aga Khan; 
the Khoja community, seemed to be an almost direct conversation. In reality the 
almost opposite was true. The Khojas from Zanzibar had approached the Aga Khan. 
In the most positive scenario, their leader was at his home in Poona, India. But since 
the end of the 19th century, Sultan Muhammad Shah had become a regular traveller, a 
moving target. Be that as it may, at some point, either at home, or whilst travelling, 
their message would have reached him. From there the message would be transferred 
to Hardinge. In turn, the Viceroy handed over the matter to his Secretary of State, 
Lord Robert Crewe-Milnes, 1st Marques of Crewe. Communication was then 
entrusted to the hands of a member of the India Office, located in London. Within the 
metropole it would then travel a short distance to a Foreign Office colleague. From 
there it would end up in the hands of the then Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, 1st 
Viscount Grey of Fallodon. His offices would then contact Edward Clarke on 
Zanzibar and convey the Aga Khan's request. By then, the original message had 
travelled three continents - Africa, Asia, Europe - and was watched by a dozen pair of 
eyes. It may have seemed that the Khojas and Edward Clarke were almost neighbours, 
but from an official point of view, they were thousands of miles apart.73 
The Aga Khan's rise had not made solving these issues easier. Ten years earlier, 
Clarke's predecessor had been dealing with the Aga Khan himself. He had then been 
able to report on the young Isma'ili leader's successful interventions and then sent this 
into the machine of foreign and colonial communication. The Aga Khan's current 
position meant that he could no longer be approached directly. Between them, there 
literally existed more than six degrees of separation. But more importantly, and most 
probably to the great shock of the Zanzibar Consul-General, three of the most 
important officers within the British Empire were now watching over his shoulder. 
And the circumstances for their involvement were less than to be desired. By denying 
the Khojas the rent of the Mnazi Moja grounds Clarke thought he maintained local 
regulation. Instead he had disturbed the interests of a well-connected political agent. 
Clarke was not sure how to proceed. On 16 February Grey had sent him another 
message, expressing once more that the followers of the Aga Khan were to be treated 
sympathetically.74 From his response, the contents of the message he had received 
could largely be deduced. Being framed as a detached, technocratic ruler of his own 
microcosm was now a serious threat. He needed to assure the Foreign Secretary that 
the issue at hand was small and under control: 
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'Rents so far collected amount to 200 rupees....I do not think that I can 
be accused of unsympathetic treatment. Without making any complaint 
to them these people endeavoured to collect rents in disregard of their 
own renunciation and direct defiance of decree to which they have 
never objected.'75 
The Consul-General still wanted a substantive debate on the proceedings of the 
Zanzibar Khojas. They were the ones that had illegally been collecting rents. The 
issue, however, had already become political. Furthermore, Clarke now needed an 
absolute guarantee that he was allowed to approach the Khoja Council. Once again, 
he asked if he was allowed to 'summon council'. If a report of the issue was to be 
drafted, at least one full conversation between the parties would be necessary. The 
Consul-General was still in the dark about the motives of the Isma'ili Khojas. 
On 20 February, permission was given to proceed. There was, however, a certain 
condition Clarke had to meet. Zanzibar decree number 8 of 1910, insofar as it 
prohibited the Khojas from renting out the Mnazi Moja grounds, had to be withdrawn. 
A conversation could take place, but only if a concession was made to the Aga Khan. 
To Grey, this seemed a reasonable request, since the rents amounted to no more than 
200 rupees.76 And thus, the Foreign Secretary asked the Consul-General to be 
forthcoming in the matter. To make sure Clarke understood that the Aga Khan was not 
just anybody, he added a small confidential note to the message: 
'Confidential. 
There are special reasons why consideration should be shown to the 
Aga Khan: You can make the concession however as coming from 
yourself.'77 
With this last sentence, Grey let the lower ranked Clarke know that this was not 
simply an order to be carried out. By exception, he provided some useful new 
information to the Clarke. The Consul General was informed on a need to know basis. 
Now he at least knew that something else was at stake. Something bigger than Mnazi 
Moja, bigger than the needs of the Khojas even. What it was, Grey was not at liberty 
to convey. On the other hand, the Khojas did not have to know that Clarke was being 
directly instructed from above. That might hurt the British reputation. 
A day later, Clarke replied in a manner showing that the message was understood, 
and the he would follow orders as well as he possibly could. But he also realised that 
the Aga Khan - by asking for a concession - had now entered negotiations. The 
distance between himself and the Aga Khan, however, was a great impediment. 
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Clarke was not worried about the complaints of the imam. These could be solved, 
when the matter was discussed face to face. The problem lay in the fact that an 
important part of the administrative leadership had been watching over their 
shoulders. This complicated matters greatly. The Isma'ili leader, he estimated, could 
surely understand his position. The island of Zanzibar and its many micro-
communities had to enter the modern era. If he could discuss the matter directly with 
the Aga Khan on relatively short notice, this would be beneficial to all. Clarke laid 
down a counter-proposal. He asked Grey if it was possible for the Aga Khan to give 
him a date for a visit to Zanzibar. Such a date would at the least put the matter at rest 
until the arrival of the Aga Khan. And as a concession, he suggested that neither party 
would collect rents until the imam arrived on the island and sat down with all parties 
involved. They could then also discuss other subjects of modernisation, such as 
education and health issues.78 
Grey now wanted to inform his "Indian" colleagues. He asked Hubert 
Montgomery to inform his colleague at the India Office of the current status with 
regard to the Mnazi Moja grounds. They had been trying to solve the issue for about 
three weeks now, without much of a result. Clark may or may not have been treating 
the Khojas unsympathetically, but it was still not quite clear why they had not 
discussed the issue with the Consul General. These kind of matters should and could 
probably be solved by others and in a better capacity: 
'Sir E. Grey thinks it would be advisable to let the Aga Khan know of 
the instructions which have been given, and also to inform him that if 
any difficulties of this sort should arise in the future, the best course 
would be for his followers in Zanzibar to address themselves'79 
But Clarke also needed to know that he was not in a position to negotiate, especially 
not when the line of communication comprised of several highly ranking officers. 
Grey was not a messenger boy. On the other hand, the dispute could probably be best 
solved if the Aga Khan indeed visited Zanzibar. An almost shorthand-like message 
was received by the Consul-General on 24 February: 
'We think it best as concession to Aga Khan to return the present to 
status quo 1899-1909. We are asking India Office to convey your 
invitation to Aga Khan and to ascertain whether he can fix date for his 
visit.'80 
Things were now clear. Clarke followed orders, and the Aga Khan was invited for a 
visit to Zanzibar. Then suddenly, the Khojas altered course. The first telegram to the 
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Viceroy was dated 8 February. His message to Hardinge therefore had to be from an 
earlier date, and communications between the Khojas and the Aga Khan preceded 
even that. There are no sources currently known that indicated the reason for their 
changed attitude. It was not unlikely that they had been waiting for about a month. 
After 26 February the followers of the Aga Khan had somehow contacted Clarke to 
discuss their Mnazi Moja quarrel. They told him that they considered the possibility 
of going to court.81 
This was a change of strategy by the Khojas. They had initially hoped to solve the 
matter to their own advantage by addressing the Aga Khan. In doing so, they had 
shown awareness of the inner workings of the British colonial system, in which you 
were only as strong as the best friend you have. He would then plead their case to 
those officers who considered the Aga Khan to be an important ally. They apparently 
knew access to justice was also obtainable in another way, and after several weeks of 
waiting they had reconsidered their options. But threatening the authorities with 
litigation while at the same time walking the political path was a different matter 
altogether. Through official colonial channels, things could possibly be solved at a 
slow pace. It involved politics, negotiations, proposals and counter-proposals. The 
matter had been going in the right direction for them as things progressed. The British 
even agreed to give them a concession. 
For an unclear reason, this apparently was not enough to the Khojas. In 1899, the 
Aga Khan also had concluded that the best solution for the time being was a 
compromise. By actively prohibiting the Khojas to rent out the remainder of Mnazi 
Moja, Clarke had broken that compromise. Perhaps they felt that the concession itself 
was not an acceptable solution. Or it may have been, inexperienced as they must have 
been in international colonial affairs, that things were not going fast enough for them. 
From a political point of view the move escalated the situation. Clarke and the 
other civil servants of the Foreign Office, felt cornered. In a telegram, they made clear 
to their India Office colleagues that if litigation should occur, any further concessions 
would immediately be off the table, and that a quick reply by the Aga Khan would, 
under the circumstances, be very helpful: 
'This of course alters matters considerably. Could you telegraph again 
to the Aga Khan to say that if, as Mr. Clarke believes, legal 
proceedings are intended, we should feel bound to authorize Mr. Clarke 
to arrange only that neither party shall collect rents pending His 
Highness’s visit to Zanzibar. Perhaps you could ask the Aga Khan for 
an early reply.'82 
In his memoirs published in 1954, the Aga Khan portrayed the Mnazi Moja agreement 
as the definitive answer to a long standing conflict. What did not hold true for 1899 - 
that it was only a dispute between the Isma'ili Khojas and the British authorities - 
certainly was true for 1912. And no other conflict had indeed arisen since then. These 
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remarks, however, were in hindsight presumably made to cover up the resurgence of 
an old disagreement.83 Until now, there had not been much at stake for the Aga Khan. 
His followers had pleaded with him about an issue he himself had dealt with some 
thirteen years earlier. They were well advised to approach him for such a matter. He 
only had to use his political influence to make the colonial apparatus bend a little, but 
now in the favour of the Isma'ili Khojas of Zanzibar. Their latest dealings with the 
Consul-General had now turned this into a risk for the Aga Khan himself. For his 
reputation among the British and therefore his relations with several of them were 
now at stake. The imam had been willing to use his influence to plead the case of his 
followers. They could expect him to do that. But in return, he asked for their loyalty. 
Nizari Isma'ilis were supposed to be British loyalists. He himself was the greatest 
example of that. Behaviours that questioned this loyalty could never be part of that. 
From his palace at Poona, the Aga Khan needed to assure the Viceroy that he was 
still loyal to everything British. In a letter dated 26 February, he explained the 
Viceroy that his position and loyalties had certainly not changed. It was true that the 
imam himself had started the affair by asking the Viceroy to exert his influence, but 
the Aga Khan could not be blamed for the recent developments. His letter therefore 
started with several remarks to control the damage that possibly had been done. He 
already knew that his followers were considering a lawsuit. The root of the problem 
was not to be found in any request by Khojas or the Aga Khan. It had been the fault of 
Zanzibar's current Consul-General Edward Clarke. He was the one that had upset the 
status quo of 1899, an agreement - although a compromise and 'bad in law' - that had 
been accomplished by the Aga Khan himself.84 
Decree number 8 of 1910 had been the source of all problems, but all the orders 
that had followed the decree had even aggravated relations. The only solution left was 
that things were restored to the status quo the imam had negotiated. Once the Aga 
Khan visited Zanzibar in the future, the affair could be arranged properly. Usually, 
Sultan Muhammad Shah was eloquent in tone. The situation had developed in such a 
manner that he could no longer conceal his displeasure: 
'If the Consul-General could see his way to leave matters alone till I go 
to Africa, I will do my utmost to arrange the matter in an amicable way 
by some friendly settlement, but it is practically impossible for me by 
letter to prevent this from becoming a source of irritation and great 
annoyance.'85 
With regard to the recent conduct of the Zanzibar Khojas, the Aga Khan was brief. He 
himself would see to it that, of course, his follower would not charge the Zanzibar 
authorities in any way. Such behaviour was inappropriate for British loyalists.86 In the 
                                                 
83 Shah, Memoirs, 60. 
84 IOR/L/PS/10/588/2, Aga Khan to DuBoulay, 26-02-1912. 
85 Ibidem. 
86 Ibidem. 
40 
 
course of several weeks, what had looked like a situation that could easily have been 
solved, was now slowly spiralling out of control. First, there had been Edward Clark; 
an extremely stubborn officer stationed at a small British outpost who simply refused 
to grant the requests of the Aga Khan. And to make matters worse, when the situation 
was not solved fast enough, his own followers proved capable of even putting the 
imam's reputation at risk. Yet, the situation that had arisen also represented 
opportunity. Sultan Muhammad Shah had turned into a skillful diplomat for his own 
cause in the past years. Although this cemetery matter was bothersome in itself, he 
had learnt that he could demand without asking. The Viceroy only needed to be 
reminded how the Aga Khan and his Isma'ilis had been of help on several occasions 
since he had entered the international stage: 
'though we do not in any way want anything in the shape of direct or 
indirect favour of any kind...Ismailies have everywhere been zealously 
loyal and during every big and small frontier war taken the British side, 
and in the days of Anglo-Russian rivalry up to 1904 were a source of 
cansular information both from Turkistan and Persia, and also when 
there was trouble with Turkey over the Yemen Hinterland did the same 
thing'87 
It is unknown at the moment to what extent the claim of the Aga Khan can be 
validated. What is certain, however, is that the British took the Aga Khan very 
seriously. Apparently, there were ways in which such officers as the Viceroy and 
perhaps also the Foreign Secretary, were able to check the Aga Khan's loyalty claims, 
not only with regard to himself, but also of his followers. Still the Aga Khan was not 
finished, for there was a clearly indicative reason for the current negative portrayal of 
his followers on Zanzibar. Other Indians, who were not in active in trade but in 
government service, spoke badly of the Isma'ili Khojas. These "pinprick Parsi's" had 
been responsible for influencing the British leadership in a negative manner. Even 
Clarke's predecessor, Basil Cave, had been affected and since 1904 given the 
followers of the Aga Khan the feeling that their presence was unwanted.88 
Here imam showed that however eloquently he could address such people as the 
Viceroy, he also possessed a fierceness. In 1899, Cave had welcomed the young Aga 
Khan to Zanzibar. They had entered negotiations together and after two and a half 
months came to an agreement. The then acting Consul-General of the island had 
written a report in which he praised the Aga Khan for is contribution. He had 
recommended the imam to the Indian Secretary of State. But now it was 1912. Basil 
Cave was no longer part of the Island's administration. The Aga Khan had moved up 
in the ranks. Cave had moved to Algiers, a place in which the imam, nor many of his 
followers, must have had much interest. The friendship of Cave, therefore, was no 
longer needed. It could thus be sacrificed in name of the greater interests of the Aga 
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Khan and his Isma'ili Khojas. The letter, however, could not be concluded without 
hinting further to the deeper causes of ill-treatment: 
'Considering the fact that it was the Ismailiahs who first developed 
East Africa 100 years ago and are now the most numerous richest 
community there, this attitude is most unreasonable.'89 
Sultan Muhammad Shah now showed that he was from the same mould as his 
grandfather. He used the opportunity of the Mnazi Moja cemetery dispute to delineate 
his own position and that of his followers, while at the same time rewriting Khoja 
history so that it would fit in neatly with a history that could explain his position as 
leader of the Isma'ilis. Only this time, the rewriting was not done in Gujarat, but on 
the shores of East Africa. 
There is a fair body of research on the coming of Indians to East Africa. These 
works generally demonstrate that, indeed, a large body of Khojas migrated at the 
beginning of the 19th century to parts of East Africa, such as Zanzibar, where they 
generally started trading businesses. None of these, however, claim that these Khojas 
came to East Africa as followers of the Aga Khan. It is through works such as Teena 
Purohit’s The Aga Khan Case that it is now generally assumed that these and other 
claims - as for example published by the centre for Isma'ili Studies - are the result of 
the Aga Khan Case of 1866, in which the Aga Khan was handed over the leadership of 
the prime section of the Khojas based on a faulty and orientalist logic. The British 
then accepted that all Khojas everywhere were, historically speaking, followers of the 
Aga Khan. 
The imam thus used the opportunity to further rewrite the history of the Khojas, 
even though it had been almost fifty years since the actual case served before the 
Bombay court. Apparently, there were still parts of the Khojas history that did not 
neatly fit in with the history of Isma'ilis. Such abnormalities could perhaps be a risk 
for his position, and since he had the means, motives and opportunity to correct them, 
he took his chances. 
From Bombay, in a letter dated 8 March, the Aga Khan continued the 
conversation. After all, through the official channels, the British had asked him 
several questions. The Khojas of Zanzibar, he wrote, were ordered to stop litigation. 
Once he could visit the Island, he would sit down with all parties to solve things. 
This, however, could not take place before the summer of 1913. It would thus be more 
than a year before the so called status quo could be solved.90 
But if things could be solved upon his visit, the Isma'ili leader doubted. Issues 
such as those mentioned earlier by Clarke were not solved easily, and these were also 
related to the historical causes mentioned earlier by the Aga Khan. Proposals for 
sanitation en education could only be acceptable to his followers if they were granted 
their own separate facilities. Nor would they allow for the government to fund these. 
Furthermore, the Aga Khan also had plans for his community. For sure, the issues 
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mentioned by the Consul-General were important. But if the he had learnt anything, 
then it was that these projects could also be a source of power to those who had to 
carry out the plans. His recently drawn up constitution therefore also contained 
sections with regard to such fields as education, welfare and health.91 In this way, he 
would remain in control over any kind of project. 
Sultan Muhammad Shah in any case made clear to the Viceroy that Mnazi Moja 
was not the only point of strife between this followers and the other communities on 
the island. Another problem that was related to the current issue was the lack of 
understanding in the literal sense. None of the European officers at the administrative 
centres of Zanzibar were able to speak Gujarati or Hindustani. The problem with this 
was that since the Isma'ili Khojas spoke English very poorly, they had to rely on other 
Indians whom they did not trust so easily. The imam had experienced this himself first 
hand in 1899, when the conversation between Khojas and the British officers present 
had to be translated by a Parsi who did a very bad job.92 
The current situation had everything to do with the earlier mentioned negative 
elements inside of the Zanzibar government, which made for a mood of negativity 
between the Indian communities on the East African island. Only in a private 
conversation would the imam be willing to tell the full story to the Viceroy, of which 
he would give a very concise summary in his letter: 
'Again all the other Indian communities, especially the Moslem ones, 
are against my people in Africa. The causes of all this I will personally 
explain to you fully before I go to East Africa, but they are historical 
causes due to the former zealously and religious begotry in Persia and 
Turkey, from whence all the Moslems to this day get their sectarian 
individuality and colour.'93 
Whether such a conversation has ever taken place is at the present unknown. What is 
known however, is that the Isma'ilis indeed have a history of persecution and slander. 
A most famous example of this is the 10th century story of the Assassins, which was 
the result of a campaign devised by Sunnis to slander the Isma'ili's of the Fatimid 
Caliphate. It was so successful that the word Assassin, taken over from its Arabic 
parent, was incorporated into several European languages.94 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, these type of claims made by the Aga Khan are 
quite problematic. There is indeed a part of Isma'ili history in which they are 
continuously assaulted, predominantly by the Sunnis. The problematic aspect to this 
day, however, is that there is a considerable time gap of approximately 500 years 
about which very little is known with regard to the fate of the Isma'ilis. This makes 
any kind of historical claim with regard to the followers of the Aga Khan in the 
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modern era uncertain. Even Farhad Daftary, one of the prime researchers and an 
eloquent historian of Isma'ili history at the Institute of Isma'ili Studies, admits that the 
'origins and early formations of the religious traditions of the Nizārī Khojas of the 
Indian subcontinent are among the least understood areas of post-Alamūt Ismailism.'95 
Most probably, the Viceroy did not know anything about the history of the 
Isma'ilis. Nor is it likely that he had an understanding of the consequences of the Aga 
Khan case for the history of the Khojas. And as far as Hardinge was concerned, the 
Aga Khan had already proven his credibility and usability in other instances. In one of 
his last letters, the Aga Khan had reminded him of that. Still, these last letters may 
have confused the Viceroy. In a letter dated 18 March, he commenced by stating that 
it 'is a little difficult to follow the nature of the problem'. Indeed, the Aga Khan had 
served him a history of Isma'ilis. But how was this related to the Mnazi Moja? 
Furthermore, there was a problem that needed solving. For Hardinge, the most 
reliable source of information he could rely on, which he also needed to address the 
situation, was the Aga Khan.96 
In February, the Aga Khan had sent him a seemingly simple request. Of course, 
Hardinge had been more than willing to help him. Since then, however, the affair had 
grown. First it had evolved into a matter involving colleagues from other offices 
located in various parts of the empire. Now, two and a half months later, the matter at 
hand seemed also seemed to be related to the history of Islam. 
His best option for giving correct orders to the others in the chain of command 
was probably to reproduce the information the imam had given him as best as he 
could, not knowing what these historical causes exactly were, if they were at any rate 
accurate, or if they could, as the Aga Khan suggested, be so easily applied to the 
Khojas and the recent dispute involving Mnazi Moja: 
'He is afraid that cannot be before the summer of 1913 at earliest, and 
when he comes he will use his utmost endeavours to bring about a 
friendly settlement of this and the other questions of sanitation and 
education referred to. These, however, will be very difficult to deal 
with unless the authorities will realise the historical causes which have 
made his people in Africa insist on separatism.'97 
And so, the information given by the Aga Khan made its way into the colonial 
channels, meant for reception at the other end of the line, at the office of Edward 
Clarke. The officers of the Foreign office were given a new version of history, in 
which the Isma'ilis were the first Indian community to actively develop East Africa in 
this version, however, the name of Basil Cave was left out: 
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'It began with misrepresentations by interested persons about 1905 that 
they were impoverishing the country, although as a fact they were the 
first to develop it.'98 
The Viceroy may have easily included the information with regard the historical 
causes of the conflict. In these things he was more or less forced to follow the Aga 
Khan. The world of colonial officers, on the other hand, the Viceroy knew only too 
well. And therefore, with regard to the imam's claims concerning Basil Cave, a fellow 
colonial officer, the Viceroy apparently kept his reserves. Such information could still 
be damaging to Cave. Moreover, solving the current situation was more probably 
more important. Involving Cave may have made an already complex situation even 
trickier. Since it was only a couple of years ago, it was not unlikely that this claim 
could be checked. The Viceroy therefore chose to focus on the core of the issue. The 
Aga Khan's complaint that most conversations between the Zanzibar authorities and 
the Isma'ili Khojas were lost in translation could not go unmentioned: 
'It has been accentuated by the fact that none of the high officials are 
able to talk with his people in their own language, and subordinate 
officials into whose hands their affairs have thus been thrown have 
believed them to be in the bad books of the Government and indulged 
in a policy of pin-pricks.'99 
These Government clerks may have been pin-pricks, but that they were also Parsi's,  
such as had been the claim of the Aga Khan, the Viceroy did not convey. In his letters, 
the Aga Khan had shown an emotional involvement with his people and the issue at 
hand. He had even admitted that the matter had become a source of annoyance to the 
imam. The Viceroy, however, may have been aware that these emotional responses 
had little effect within the official circles. Furthermore, the Aga Khan may have 
demonstrated his feelings on the subject to the Viceroy, this did not mean that these 
were meant for all eyes. And perhaps the Aga Khan already regretted some of his 
harsh words. For these reasons, it is quite possible that the Viceroy chose to convey 
the Aga Khan's wishes in a way that made them suitable for the official channels. 
After all, the Aga Khan had also clearly stated that he and his followers were loyal 
British subjects: 
'His people want no favour but a little more sympathy, and in view of 
their consistent loyalty to the British Empire all the world over, he 
thinks that they are not unreasonable in asking it.'100 
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This was indeed exactly what the imam had asked for. As loyal subjects the Isma'ili 
Khojas demanded a fair treatment by the authorities. That the Aga Khan felt he could 
explicitly ask for such treatment because of his apparent role in several international 
matters, the Viceroy did not include. This information was most likely too sensitive to 
be shared with others. Such realities were to be cherished only through channels the 
Viceroy could control. 
On 10 April 1912, Edward Clark Sent a telegram. From the message itself it is 
impossible to retrieve to whom it was sent, but the most likely destination was the 
Foreign Office. He had met with the Council for a first time on 3 April and a second 
time on the 10th. Given the outcome of the conversation and the turbulent recent 
history that had been involved, Clarke had felt the need to give a full report, which 
was to arrive by mail.101 The report, which was addressed to Sir Edward Grey and 
dated 11 April, arrived on 4 May 1912. Clarke had, after receiving permission to 
approach the Khojas, asked them to come and talk. He knew that much was at stake. 
Facing the council alone could very well lead to a misstep. Therefore, he had asked 
for a Mr Shearman-Turner to accompany him and give legal assistance should such be 
needed. Also, another colonial officer, Mr. Sinclair, was present.  
The Consul-General started the conversation. Three months since the beginning of 
the conflict he still did not fully understand what had caused the dispute in the first 
place. In his mind, going to the Aga Khan without first talking to authorities certainly 
attributed for much of the trouble they now faced. Had they realised that, by not doing 
so, many of the most highly placed officers in the empire had gotten involved? To 
Clarke, such a local matter could have easily been solved in a matter of minutes. It 
should never have been blown up to the proportions it had now reached. Instead, the 
Secretary of State for India, the Foreign Secretary, the Viceroy and not to mention 
their own spiritual head had now gotten involved.102 This had turned the whole affair 
into a matter of international interest and state security. Clarke and the Khojas lived 
minutes away from each other, but it had now taken them months to arrive at their 
current conversation. 
For Clarke, the report should demonstrate that he was not to blame for the current 
standing of affairs. He had waited for months to arrive at this point. His messages 
over the course of these months had been partly filled with frustration: over the lack 
of substantive debate, over the limitations that had been imposed on him, over the 
lack of control he had over any of this. But now, he was face to face with them, these 
Khojas. There was no longer anybody between them; no Edward Grey, no Viceroy, no 
Aga Khan. He had used his time well, and had not come to the meeting unprepared. 
The first question he fired off was one he had been bothered with since the very 
beginning of all trouble: why had they gone to the Aga Khan? 
'After a good deal of shuffling and hesitation they said that they had 
done so under the impression that it was I who was responsible for the 
orders in regard to the collection of rents on the Mnazi Moja a step 
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which had let to their action. They admitted that they had taken no 
steps whatever to ascertain whether this was indeed the case; or 
whether, if so, I might not be prepared to reconsider the position. They 
were very sorry they had not come to me; they said now that they saw 
that they had made a mistake but they had been hurried into it by the 
impatience of their community.'103 
Shuffling and hesitation. Clarke portrayed the Khojas as a band of men, unclear in 
acts and thoughts. They in any case had now apologised for their assumptions with 
regard to the decree. And although it had been Clarke who had issued decree no. 8, 
the Consul-General did not refute these. Instead, he accepted their apologies without 
further ado. Unrest within the community, not the Aga Khan, had led to improvidence 
which had prevented the Khojas from contacting the then newly appointed Consul-
General. 
Now that this first matter was settled, it was time to dive deeper into what Clarke 
saw as the root of the problem. He asked the Khojas if they could give him a copy of 
the petition they had sent to the Aga Khan. This would most likely be the easiest way 
to ascertain precisely what the grievances and wishes of the Isma'ili Khojas were. To 
his surprise, the council was reluctant on giving him their communications. Indeed, as 
the Aga Khan had already conveyed, language had been one of the problems: 
'This request evidently confused them a good deal: and after much 
hesitation they said that is was a long time since the petition had been 
sent; moreover it was in English and they really did not know even at 
the time they despatched it, exactly what it did or did not say: in these 
circumstances they hoped I would not mind if, before agreeing to give 
me a copy they looked at it again.'104 
The time-line with regard to the Mnazi Moja dispute had now become even more 
chaotic. The Khojas now claimed that, in the period before the Viceroy's telegram of 8 
February, they had contacted their spiritual head. The problem was that their wishes 
could only be communicated in English, a language in which none of them 
presumably was very fluent. Therefore, a translator needed to be hired. They, at any 
rate, were thus unable to check conclusively what the translator had written down. 
They contended that out of this lacuna a conflict had now arisen between them. 
Clarke, on the other hand, did not believe any of this but he did not tell the Khojas. 
They were after all still the followers of the Aga Khan. He had learnt that these people 
possessed a certain amount of political influence, and he could therefore not call them 
liars to their faces. But could raise his doubts in the report to his superiors: 
                                                 
103 IOR/L/PS/10/588/2, Clarke's report on encounter with Khoja council, 11-04-1912. 
104 Ibidem. 
47 
 
'I may observe, parenthetically, that it is obvious that they must have 
known perfectly well that the petition said, and that their reluctance to 
let me see it must have arisen from the fact that it contains statements 
which they would be unable to support.'105 
Especially since the start of the dispute over the Mnazi Moja Decree, Clarke must 
have developed a strong sense of distrust with regard to the Khojas. He was now 
suspicious of every move the made and every snippet of information they gave him. 
He on the other hand, was also no longer willing to be completely fair with them, 
even if they wrongly assessed that he had not been the driving force behind the Mnazi 
Moja decree. Nevertheless, now that he at least was talking to the Khoja council, the 
Consul-General did not want to give up so easily. If they could not give him in 
writing what their grievances were, perhaps they were willing to tell him. Upon this 
request, the Khojas confirmed that it indeed had been the Mnazi Moja decree of 1910, 
and the fact that it prohibited them from renting out the remained of the land, that had 
caused them to complain. 
This, the Khojas explained, had been the last incident in a long line of events by 
which the rights of the Khojas to the Mnazi Moja grounds had slowly been curbed. 
For a large part, this was an argument Clarke had also heard through the colonial 
channels, and thus he knew exactly how to respond. The difference was that he could 
now confront the Khojas directly with his arguments, and have the substantive debate 
with them he for months had desired. Why, Clarke asked the Khojas, had they been so 
upset by this? At an earlier stage, he had already conveyed to his superiors that by 
article three of the Mnazi Moja agreement of 1899, the Khojas had given up all their 
rights with regard to the remainder of the grounds. They had never answered this 
question. Now he could directly confront the Khojas. Had they no knowledge of the 
Mnazi Moja agreement?106 According to Clarke, the Khojas had no knowledge of the 
agreement that had been made only thirteen years prior. Clarke then asked if the 
Khojas had any other complaints with regard to Mnazi Moja. The Khojas then replied 
that they indeed also had other complaints. They told him that the Government had 
ill-treated the Khojas with regard to the placement of a Wireless Station on Mnazi 
Moja. This, Clarke did not take very seriously: 
'I pointed out that it was somewhat late in the day to raise this question, 
seeing that the Station had stood on its present position for over five 
years.'107 
In recent years, a wireless station had indeed been built on the Mnazi Moja grounds. 
From Clarke's description, it is possible to deduce that it had been built under the 
leadership of Basil Cave. The agreement of 1899 was very clear on what the 
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government was allowed to do with Mnazi Moja. Building structures on Mnazi Moja 
an infringement. Only temporary structures for purposes of leisure, or protection 
against sea flooding were allowed.108 
But Clarke no longer had the patience to listen to the grievances of the Khojas. In 
1899 the original agreement had been made under the last Jamat of Isma'ili Khojas. 
Basil Cave had been present. He had put his signature under the document. He had 
also known how much trouble the parties had gone through with the creation of the 
agreement. If Clarke had listened carefully, he could now have known that, after a few 
years, Cave had also not kept his part of the deal. Given that Cave had already broken 
the agreement in the years after 1899, the decree of 1910 most likely was not the first 
violation the Khojas had dealt with. Clarke asked once more if there were any other 
grievances with regard to the Mnazi Moja grounds, but the Khojas were now silent: 
'To this enquiry, though I pressed it more than once, they were unable 
to make any reply. I observed that, whatever these other grievances 
might be, it did not appear to me that they could be of a very serious 
character.'109 
Ignoring his own acts and those of his predecessor, Clarke concluded in his report that 
none of the complaints by the Khojas were at any rate credible to him. This was one 
of the main points he wanted to emphasise to his superiors, thereby implying that they 
had given priority to a quirk of the Aga Khan, while they should have stopped and 
listen to rationale of the Consul-General. The first meeting ended, and both parties 
agreed to meet again a week later, so that the Khojas could better prepare themselves 
and discuss their case with Clarke. 
On 10 April, the Isma'ili Khojas and the Consul-General met again. This time the 
council had also brought a lawyer. Clarke was given a letter in which the lawyer 
explained that he had not been able to attend their previous meeting because of 
illness, but more importantly, the council had decided it was not able to hand him 
over any documentation or communication without the explicit approval of His 
Highness the Aga Khan.110 Clarke was annoyed by this: 
'I would observe, en passant, that when I suggested on our first 
interview that they should show me the petition, they based their 
refusal to do...not on the necessity of first consulting the Aga Khan but 
on the fact that they did not for the moment remember exactly what it 
said.'111 
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In his report, the Consul-General had embarked on a mission to demonstrate the 
shortcomings of the Khoja council. They had already taken the British by surprise at 
an earlier date; Clarke could now also show that they were inconsistent in their 
statements. They used whatever suited them best depending on the situation, the 
Consul-General implied. He asked them again what their reply was with regard to 
decree no. 8. They repeated their initial answer. 
Clarke asked them again what their grievances were with regard to the wireless 
station. They again repeated that they could not say anything without consent of their 
leader. Clarke had had enough. He had been patient, and waited for the permission of 
his superiors to approach the Khojas. Although he completely disagreed with it, as a 
concession to the Aga Khan he had even agreed to offering the Khojas his approval 
for renting out the lands of Mnazi Moja for the time being.112 Then, after several 
months, he had finally gotten the opportunity to engage into a conversation with the 
council. He had been even more patient, and given them the opportunity to thoroughly 
prepare themselves by postponing their meeting for another week. The current reply 
by the Khoja council, must have been completely unacceptable to the Consul-General. 
Finally, he could talk to the Khojas, but they did not cooperate. Clarke then moved to 
offer them the negotiated concession of renting out the lands of Mnazi Moja, and they 
replied in the same manner again. The Consul-General was at a loss. Why did the 
Khojas no longer respond to his questions? Why, if they had already decided to only 
act and speak on the explicit consent of the Aga Khan, had they brought a lawyer? 
Why had they agreed to talks in the first place? This concluded negotiations: 
'In such circumstances, I concluded, it seemed to me that further 
discussion was useless; and the interview then terminated. 
I am afraid that I am quite unable to offer any plausible explanation of 
this conduct on the part of the Council. 
It may be that they are merely angry with the Aga Khan for not having 
let them know what he was doing: or possibly they are irritated with 
him because when they had sent him in a whole string of grievances he 
had only pressed for the remedy of one. Or again, and I rather incline 
on this solution, it is the Aga Khan with whom in reality they are angry 
for ever having approved of the famous Agreement: it may well be that 
they want to obtain his assistance towards upsetting it altogether and 
that, this being so, they do not wish to discuss the matter and still less 
to accept any concession on my part as possibly tending to the 
weakening of their position. The sudden appearance of a lawyer on the 
scene lends, I think, some colour to this supposition: as also the fact 
that while at my interview with them on the 3rd instant they told me 
that all they wanted was a little time to consider how best they could 
                                                 
112 IOR/L/PS/10/588/2, Clarke's report on encounter with Khoja council, 11-04-1912. 
50 
 
present their case, yesterday they declined altogether to say anything in 
regard to it. 
The Aga Khan’s omission to let his followers know what he was doing 
for them is still more inexplicable – and I am afraid I cannot even 
hazard a guess as to the reasons of His Highness’ action in regard to 
this point.'113 
The problem for Clarke was one of source material: he had no proof for any of the 
explanations he offered. It is most unlikely that the Consul-General had any 
knowledge of the communications between the Khojas and the Aga Khan. Without 
such information it was impossible for him to ascertain what the Aga Khan had 
exactly told the Khojas, if he had indeed only addressed one out of many issues, and 
if the Khojas indeed wanted to get rid of the Mnazi Moja agreement altogether. 
For his last contention, however, there is one indication. In his letter of 26 
February, the Aga Khan writes to the Viceroy that he indeed considers the Mnazi 
Moja agreement to be 'bad in law'.114 Most likely, Clarke has never seen this letter. 
His suspicions were founded only on the information he had received from the 
Foreign Office and his own experiences with the Isma'ili Khojas. It is therefore highly 
unlikely that his guesses were anything other than speculation. The Consul-General's 
report bared the markings of a man that felt he had failed. He had already accused the 
Khojas, now he was also accusing the Aga Khan. He already knew what was coming. 
His report would - no doubt - also be sent to the India Office. From there it would 
possibly be sent to the Viceroy and beyond. He had offered the Khojas all he could, 
but still there had been no final solution to the incomprehensible situation he had now 
been caught in: 
'the results of the steps which have been taken at their sollicitation and 
the complete failure of my earnest efforts to arrive at a satisfactory 
solution of these difficulties – efforts in which I have certainly rather 
gone beyond than fallen short of your instructions.'115 
Since the Khojas had not accepted the offer of renting out the land, Clarke saw no 
other option than to let the matter make its way into the Courts of Zanzibar which, 
after all, the Khojas had intended to do at an earlier stage. There, perhaps, he could 
deliver battle in a way that made sense to the Consul-General. There, perhaps, he 
could convince the other parties of the legitimacy of his claims.116 For, as it had been 
for a long time, Mnazi Moja was too important to be simply handed over to the likes 
of the Khoja council: 
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'You may not perhaps be aware that this is absolutely the only open 
space of any size within a walk of the town where it is possible for 
Europeans to take such exercise as golf and for the Indian children to 
play cricket. To allow it therefore to fall ever so little under the control 
of such impracticable and pettifogging persons as the Khoja 
community have always proved themselves, is absolutely and entirely 
out of the question.'117 
Still not able to fully accept, it was clear that Edward Clarke, Consul-General and his 
Majesty's Agent at the East African island of Zanzibar, had lost. But whether this 
meant that either the Khojas or the Aga Khan, or perhaps still someone else had 
actually won the new dispute over Mnazi Moja, still was not clear. 
In conclusion, between 1899 and 1912 the Aga Khan's status as political agent and 
informant had grown. His interests were now represented by the Viceroy. Edward 
Clarke underestimated the diplomatic weight of Mnazi Moja and the players involved 
in these grounds. Within the ranks of the British colonial system not all estimated the 
interests and interrelation between the religious and political status of the Aga Khan 
the Isma'ili Khojas in the same manner. 
In 1899, the young imam had earned his place at the negotiating table because of 
his position as religious leader. In 1912, his career as colonial agent and informant 
had also raised his political status. In the course of these years, the Aga Khan 
gradually portrayed himself and his followers as British loyalists of which the British 
were dependent as a source of information. He did not hesitate to use this political 
influence in the interests of his followers, especially in matters in which in he had 
been personally involved. As an important side-effect, the imam also strengthened his 
own position as leader of the Isma'ili Khojas of Zanzibar. 
Clarke blamed the Khojas as the cause for his own decree of 1910. By intelligently 
using the available local legal documents he was able to hide the real causes for 
issuing decree no. 8 behind a fog of personal interests. Furthermore, he was not 
willing to immediately respond to the wishes of higher placed officers such as the 
viceroy. 
Both information from the Aga Khan and Edward Clarke was filtered by the 
colonial communication chain in the same manner. This was not reserved for colonial 
subjects such as the Aga Khan. 
By considering a lawsuit while still walking the political path the Khojas made 
clear that their interests did not always coincide with those of the Aga Khan. They 
explored the possibility of litigation even if this meant that they were not longer 
viewed as British loyalists and damaging the Aga Khan's reputation. This was 
unacceptable to the Isma'ili leader and he was capable of correcting them at a distance 
because of the legal system he had introduced several years earlier in which he held 
the highest power. 
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Conclusion 
 
Epilogue  
On 19 November 1912, a solution to the Mnazi Moja dispute presented itself. By the 
look of it, none of the higher ranking British colonial officers were directly involved. 
Instead, the local Isma'ili Khojas had made available another stretch of land to which 
the wireless station positioned at Mnazi Moja would be moved. In that manner a local 
problem, eventually, was also locally solved: 
'Copy 
Decode Cypher Telegram from Mr. Clarke (Zanzibar) 
Date November 19th, 1912. 
No. 202. 
Following for Aga Khan "Zanzibar Government would like to remove 
wireless telegraph installation from where it is now near Mnazi Moja 
Burial ground to ground belonging to Your Highness given by Sala 
Warras about which Rai Mitha Jessa wrote to you six months ago. 
Would be glad if you could see your way making this exchange and if 
so if you would let me know and also telegraph to executors as matter 
is somewhat pressing request early reply". Message ends.'118 
The goal of this thesis has been to shed more light on the relationship between the 
Khojas, the Aga Khan and the British on the Island of Zanzibar during the period 
1899-1912. Consequently, a micro-history of the Khojas of Zanzibar has been 
retrieved, primarily from the archives of the India Office Records. The sources have 
been analysed by first reading, carefully, along the grain of the events leading to the 
Mnazi Moja dispute of 1912 and then, where needed, against it. 
In 1866 the legal status of Aga Khan I and that of the Khojas became entangled 
with each other as a result of the Aga Khan court case. From 1899 onward, Aga Khan 
III added to this status a strong political international component. This changed 
political status of the Aga Khan had several consequences. For certain parts of the 
colonial apparatus it meant that they attached importance to the local interests of the 
Isma'ili leader. 
To officers such as Charles Hardinge Mnazi Moja was a means to exert influence 
on the Aga Khan. Satisfying the imam's needs would quite possibly make him more 
willing to provide the British empire with useful information. To Edward Clarke the 
Aga Khan's political status was of significantly less importance. For him Mnazi Moja 
was the only speck of open land available near Zanzibar town, and the Khojas were, 
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in the first place normal colonial subjects who should be kept in check. Depending on 
one's position within the colonial system, the status attributed to the Aga Khan and 
the Khojas of the Island of Zanzibar therefore differed considerably. 
For the Isma'ili Khojas of Zanzibar it meant that they were being portrayed by the 
Aga Khan as British loyalists. Khojas had been burying their dead on Mnazi Moja 
long before the Aga Khan set foot on the island of Zanzibar. Their interest lay in the 
first place with the burial ground, not with the Aga Khan's status, political, legal, 
religious or otherwise. In 1912, they initially decided to defend their local interests by 
playing along with the Aga Khan and walking the political path. 
They did not realise, however, that there was no way back. By choosing to 
politicise the status of Mnazi Moja, the grounds containing the Khoja cemetery 
became the subject of a game of political interests. That the Khojas had no such 
intentions became clear when they considered charging the Zanzibar authorities, but 
by now the Aga Khan's interests were also at stake, and he was not prepared to let his 
reputation of British loyalist be damaged over a local conflict. The Isma'ili Khojas of 
Zanzibar during the period 1899-1912 may have been followers of the Aga Khan. 
This did not mean that their interests were always one and the same. 
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